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ABSTRACT 
 
This study is a compendium of historiography. The papers focus on transformative 
twentieth-century events:  
The first considers the Supreme Court’s shift from New Deal opponent to facilitator. 
Internal explanations of evolving judicial philosophy causing change countered external ones 
stressing political pressure. Debate became more complex when scholars argued both internal 
and external pressures altered the Court’s jurisprudence.  
The second reviews the atomic bombing of Japan. Post-World War II Consensus 
historians justified the United States attacks as saving lives by shortening the war. In the 1960s, 
New Left revisionists pointed to atomic diplomacy. Since the 1990s, Post-revisionism has gained 
acceptance, integrating and broadening Consensus and New Left positions. 
The third examines the Brezhnev Doctrine as a mechanism for the Soviet Union 
controlling satellite nations. The traditional view aligned the decline of the doctrine with 
Gorbachev’s liberalization policies. Recent analysis ties Soviet abandonment of the doctrine to 
the Polish Crisis of 1980-1981. 
  
iv 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
Many people contributed to my efforts in the writing of this Master’s paper. 
My deepest appreciation extends to Dr. Mark Harvey, my advisor and instructor in 
classes, who unfailingly provided wise encouragement. Dr. John Cox, Dr. Angela Smith, and Dr. 
Dale Sullivan served with Dr. Harvey on my committee. Their guidance inspired me to attempt 
to do my best. I owe them a debt of gratitude.  
Dr. Cox, Dr. Harvey, Dr. David Danbom, and Dr. Jim Norris provided core instruction in 
my Master’s study at North Dakota State University. Their enthusiasm for history was infectious. 
Because of them, I believe I gained a sure foundation in North Dakota, Western, United States, 
Latin American, and Eastern European histories. The highest compliment I can pay them is by 
writing here, I learned a lot.  
To the Graduate School personnel, especially Dean David Wittrock and Cathy Marks, 
thank you for your flexibility and understanding when life circumstances arose challenging this 
distance education student.  
The personal and material support of the James Madison Memorial Fellowship 
Foundation was fundamental in allowing me to pursue the Master’s degree in History. Along 
with the helpful staff, I especially wish to thank the President, Lew Larsen and the past director 
of academics, Dr. Herman Belz. As my advisor during the Foundation’s Summer Institute on the 
Constitution at Georgetown University, Dr. Belz helped impart an understanding of the shaping 
of American democracy that combined with foundation sponsored classes at Ashland University 
strengthened my study in United States History when I resumed coursework at NDSU.  
v 
In the compiling of these papers, I must compliment the professionalism of my editor 
Fern J. Hill; her contribution to the successful completion of my study has been invaluable. At 
Devils Lake High School, I wish to acknowledge the good will of my colleague Dr. Jeff Stotts, 
who encouraged me to apply for the Madison Fellowship and my principal, Mr. Ryan Hanson, 
who made it possible to adjust my teaching schedule so I could attend night classes at NDSU.  
Finally, and most importantly, to many friends and all my family, an appreciation of your 
uplifting forbearance of my journey to a Master’s degree has not been recognized enough. On 
this we will share words and celebration. But in this moment, to my brothers Robert and Richard, 
your belief in the value of knowing history was always welcome. To my dear friend Sharon 
Hansen, your sustained interest in the process and belief in a successful completion of the 
Master’s degree will always be remembered with gratitude. To my sisters Mary and Jacqueline, 
your focus on the destination bolstered my resolve. To my brothers James, Thomas, and William, 
your lives spent making history deepened my desire to understand the significance of past 
events. To my son Jeremy, when history has taken me away, I have missed you.   
vi 
DEDICATION 
 
Born to teachers, I am blessed to be the son of Daniel and Victoria (Hoffman) Wakefield 
who by their example passed on the importance of education. As young adults, Dan and Vic 
began their life-long work teaching, first to children in one-room classrooms in northern 
Wisconsin during the Great Depression. During this time, my father pursued his dream of flying. 
World War II saw Dan’s newly acquired flight ratings thrust him into aviation full time 
instructing military flying cadets. My father’s passion for flight spanned decades as he logged 
thousands of hours in a distinguished flying career that included expertly instructing hundreds of 
pilots ‘stick and rudder’ along with insights to life. My mother continued to teach when possible. 
With great, sustained effort, Vic balanced dual roles in raising eight children with the support of 
my father and advancing her teaching skills while my father was away flying. Many summers 
she returned to Wisconsin, where she attended university, upgrading her normal school license to 
a Bachelor’s degree. Vic succeeded admirably in her long, intermittent teaching career. Her love 
and compassion for children, especially for the disabled and underprivileged, infused with an 
unusual, endearing sense of humor made her a star in the classroom. Over those years, my 
mother encouraged me to get a Master’s degree. Finally, after my own career in aviation in our 
family’s flying business, I returned to teaching and was drawn to learning. In no small way, 
seeking this Masters degree in history results from acting on the belief in education my mother 
instilled in me. In the last years of my mother’s life, though her mind remained keen, she 
suffered a wide range of disability. With joy, I was able to tell her in August, 2014 that I had 
successfully defended and would finish the Master’s degree. Victoria Wakefield left this life in 
September, 2014. This Master’s paper is dedicated to her memory.  
vii 
PREFACE 
 
This collection of historiographies represents the results of research originating in North 
American, World, and European History readings courses. Based on an interest in the World 
War II generation, the author chose topics from historic periods integrally connected to the 
progression of their lives: The Great Depression, World War II, and the Cold War. The Hughes 
court’s change in jurisprudence, the United States use of atomic bombs against Japan, and the 
Soviet Union’s threat of the Brezhnev Doctrine profoundly affected humanity in the twentieth 
century. Generations of historians have continued to analyze these events due to their ongoing 
transformative effects on history. The purpose of these study papers is to evaluate their efforts. 
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I. HISTORICAL REASSESSMENT OF CHANGE IN THE 1930s HUGHES SUPREME 
COURT’S CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE 
 
Beginning in 1935, the United States Supreme Court blocked critical elements of 
President Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal program meant to rescue the nation from the worst 
depression in American history.1 The Democratic Party swept the 1936 United States 
congressional and presidential elections in a landslide vote, running up significant majorities in 
the House of Representatives and the Senate, and carrying all but two states in the Electoral 
College.2 Roosevelt was determined to use his electoral mandate to change the Supreme Court’s 
composition by creating a super-majority which would uphold New Deal legislation. On 
February 5, 1937, Roosevelt announced a legislative plan to expand the Supreme Court. What 
followed was an epic political fight that consumed the nation’s attention. Congress and the 
public ultimately rejected what became known as the court-packing bill. Though in a dramatic 
turn-around, the United States Supreme Court began to allow for significant governmental 
involvement in the economy; this shift has been termed the “Constitutional Revolution” of 
1937.3 
                                               
1 Peter Irons, A People’s History of the Supreme Court: The Men and Women Whose 
Cases and Decisions Have Shaped Our Constitution 2nd ed. (New York: Penguin Books, 2006), 
299-306; Fred Rodell, Nine Men: A Political History of the Supreme Court from 1790 to 1955 
(New York: Random House, 1955), 233-238; Bernard Schwartz, A History of the Supreme Court 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 232. 
2 Robert F. Himmelberg, The Great Depression and the New Deal (Westport, CN: 
Greenwood Press, 2001), 63; Rodell, Nine Men, 243; Irons, A People’s History, 312. 
3 James MacGregor Burns, Packing the Court: The Rise of Judicial Power and the 
Coming Crisis of the Supreme Court (New York: Penguin Press, 2009), 145-152; Schwartz, A 
History, 231-236; Irons, A People’s History, 318. Note: Irons’s A People’s History, is one 
prominent place where a variation of the oft-quoted expression “The Constitutional 
Revolution of 1937” appears. 
2 
For decades, historians have studied the Supreme Court decisions during this period and 
questioned the influences that compelled the court, led by Chief Justice Hughes, to change 
direction. Varying schools of historiographical thought have separated the debate into two 
distinct frameworks that have focused on internal and external reasons for the court’s turn from 
barrier to facilitator of New Deal programs. Over time, the debate has become more complex 
with recognition from scholars that both internal and external pressures moved the Court to alter 
its course.4 This paper examines the historiography from the 1930s into the twenty-first century, 
explaining the Hughes court’s dramatic shift in jurisprudence.  
The groundbreaking change in the Supreme Court’s application of the Constitution to the 
New Deal cannot be understood without an accompanying awareness of the contemporary 
condition of the nation. The economic statistics of the Great Depression illustrate how 
Americans suffered on a broad scale during that era. The misery the numerical data conveys 
remains compelling when analyzing the actions of the executive branch of the United States 
government during the decade of the 1930s and the effect of those actions on the Supreme Court. 
The drastic decline in 1929 of the United States stock market shook the confidence of 
Americans, but marked only a bellwether for the distress to follow. In 1931 alone, 2,294 banks 
holding $1.7 billion in deposits closed, wiping out their depositors’ savings. By 1932, 
                                               
4 Michael E. Parrish, The Hughes Court: Justices, Rulings, and Legacy (Santa Barbara, 
CA: ABC-CLIO, 2002) 177-187; Michael E. Parrish, “The Hughes Court, the Great 
Depression, and the Historians.” The Historian XL no. 2 (1978): 286-308; Rodell, Nine Men, 
31; Noah Feldman, Scorpions: The Battles and Triumphs of FDR’s Great Supreme Court 
Justices (New York: Twelve, 2010), 117-118; G. Edward White, “Constitutional Change and the 
New Deal: The Internalist/Externalist Debate,” American Historical Review 110 no. 4 (2005), 
1111-1115; Alan Brinkley, “The Debate over the Constitutional Revolution of 1937: 
Introduction.” American Historical Review 110 no. 4 (2005), 1047-1050; Laura Kalman, 
“The Constitution, the Supreme Court, and the New Deal” American Historical Review 110 
no. 4 (2005), 1054-1055. 
3 
agricultural commodity prices had fallen 55 percent, compounding debt and causing widespread 
foreclosures. One-third of the nation’s farmers lost their livelihoods. Between 1929 and 1932, 
industrial output dropped by half. This led to massive unemployment for factory workers. The 
decade-long downturn would become the worst economic depression in United States history.5 
The desperate situation of many Americans and a pervasive belief among voters that the Hoover 
administration’s policies could not stop the decline resulted in a Democratic victory, and the 
election of Franklin Roosevelt as president in 1932. In his inaugural address, Roosevelt 
communicated that putting people to work was the key to America’s recovery. The president’s 
speech helped reassure the nation, outlining a vision that demanded action from its citizens and 
promised active engagement from the government.6  
In Roosevelt’s first months in office, the administration began writing legislation to 
tackle the economic problems the country faced. The New Deal created an unprecedented 
number of governmental initiatives into banking, agriculture, public works, conservation, and 
public utilities while providing relief to millions who remained unemployed.7 Opposition to 
Roosevelt’s New Deal from citizens who feared the power of expansive government, especially 
in the economy, led to court challenges that eventually worked their way to the United States 
Supreme Court. In a number of rulings beginning in 1935, the Court ruled against New Deal 
legislation, jeopardizing the Roosevelt administration’s policies that sought to end the Great 
Depression.8 The Roosevelt administration further inflamed conservative resistance in the 
                                               
5 Himmelberg, Great Depression, 7-12. 
6 Nick Taylor, American-made: The Enduring Legacy of the WPA: When FDR Put the 
Nation to Work (New York: Bantam Books, 2008), 89. 
7 Robert S. McElvaine, The Great Depression: America, 1929-1941 (New York: Times 
Books, 1984), 147-156; Himmelberg, Great Depression, 15-17. 
8 Schwartz, A History, 232. 
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business community in the run-up to the 1936 election because of tax hikes and Second New 
Deal programs passed during 1935.9 An array of commercial interests considered federal 
economic initiatives in agriculture, industry, and labor, such as the revised Agricultural 
Adjustment Act, the Tennessee Valley Authority, and other massive work relief programs, to be 
anti-business and socialistic.10 A solid majority of the electorate supported Roosevelt principally 
because of gains made from the depths of the depression in income and employment. In the 
process of rolling up an historic landslide electoral victory in 1936, the Democrats grafted a New 
Deal Coalition of traditional Southern and Western supporters with an influx of Northern and 
Eastern workers and minorities that would long remain a potent force in national politics.11 In his 
retrospective history of the Supreme Court, legal scholar Fred Rodell quoted Alexis de 
Tocqueville, the nineteenth-century French observer of American life: “Hardly any political 
question arises in the United States that is not resolved sooner or later into a judicial question.”12 
A national debate over the proper role of the Supreme Court in ruling on New Deal legislation 
persisted as an issue throughout the 1936 presidential campaign, confirming de Tocqueville’s 
judgment. 
In reaction to much of the first New Deal, the American Liberty League formed early 
opposition to Roosevelt for initiating transformative policies on the role of the national 
                                               
9 Robert Goldston, The Great Depression: The United States in the Thirties (New York: 
Bobbs-Merrill, 1968), 146; William E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New 
Deal 1932-1940 (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), 152; James F. Simon, FDR and Chief 
Justice Hughes: The President, the Supreme Court, and the Epic Battle Over the New Deal (New 
York: Simon & Schuster, 2012), 291-292. 
10 Himmelberg, Great Depression, 41-51. 
11 Parrish, The Hughes Court, 214-215; Michael J. Webber, New Deal Fat Cats: 
Business, Labor, and Campaign Finance in the 1936 Presidential Election (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 2000), 10-12; Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt, 184-191. 
12 Rodell, Nine Men, 216-217. 
5 
government which they considered threatening to the Constitution. Organized by prominent 
Democrats in 1934, the league promoted states’ rights and limited government, and resented 
Roosevelt’s takeover of the Democratic Party. In addition to backing the Republican presidential 
candidate, Kansas governor Alf Landon in 1936, the attorneys for the league and other business 
organizations devised judicial lines of attack against New Deal laws regulating the economy.13 In 
September 1935, a Gallup poll revealed Roosevelt’s popularity rating had dropped to 50 
percent.14 Furthermore, 53 percent of those surveyed opposed placing limits on the Court’s 
power to rule on the constitutionality of congressional legislation.15  
Across the country, groups sympathetic with the Liberty League proliferated and pledged 
to defend the Constitution.16 At the other end of the political spectrum, extremist fringe elements 
dissatisfied with the slow pace of New Deal change opposed Roosevelt as well. Remnants of the 
large national followings of Louisiana Senator Huey Long’s Share-Our-Wealth organization, 
Father Charles Coughlin’s radio audiences, and Dr. Francis Townsend’s old age pension clubs 
combined with the rural populism of North Dakota Representative William Lemke’s third party 
presidential candidacy. None of Roosevelt’s opponents, however, gained traction on a national 
stage. Lemke’s Union Party received less than one million popular votes nationwide, while 
                                               
13 Rodell, Nine Men, 240-243; Parrish, Hughes Court:Justices, 193-194; Himmelberg, 
The Great Depression, 64; Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt, 178-179; Goldston, Great 
Depression, 148-149; Walter F. Murphy, C. Herman Pritchett, and Lee Epstein. Courts, Judges, 
& Politics: An Introduction to the Judicial Process, 5th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2002), 
252; Jeff Shesol, Supreme Power: Franklin Roosevelt v. The Supreme Court (New York: W.W. 
Norton & Company, 2010), 163. 
14 Himmelberg, Great Depression, 41-51. 
15 Simon, FDR and Chief Justice, 269. 
16 Shesol, Supreme Power, 162. 
6 
Roosevelt won the election handily with an overwhelming 61 percent victory over his main 
Republican Party contender, Alf Landon.17 
Roosevelt had ridiculed the Supreme Court in the aftermath of their adverse decisions in 
1935. During his 1936 run for re-election, however, the president directed his formidable 
campaign rhetoric to passionately blasting “economic royalists” in big business, industry, and 
media.18 In doing so, Roosevelt ran against his predecessor, President Hoover’s memory and 
conservative financial interests while ignoring his opponent Landon and seldom invoking the 
Democratic Party.19 By 1936, the second New Deal had gained support of progressives across 
party lines.20 Similarly, Landon also favored progressive policies in the areas of the economy, 
civil liberties, labor rights, and welfare, and campaigned as a moderate alternative to Roosevelt 
by limiting his attacks on the administration to criticism of New Deal waste and bureaucracy.21 
Both Roosevelt and Landon limited direct comments in addressing the role of the Supreme Court 
in solving the country’s economic crisis. In contrast to their standard bearers’ muted court 
controversy electioneering, the major parties actively disputed the Court’s impact on the nation 
during Roosevelt’s first term.22  
                                               
17 Himmelberg, Great Depression, 64-65; Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt, 181-182; 
Goldston, Great Depression, 149-151; Shesol, Supreme Power, 239. 
18 Webber, New Deal, 11. 
19 Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt, 183-191. 
20 Goldston, The Great Depression, 150-151; Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt, 190. 
21 Irons, A People’s History, 311; Shesol, Supreme Power, 226, 229; Leuchtenburg, 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, 175. 
22 Irons, A People’s History, 303-311; Shesol, Supreme Power, 215-217. 
7 
In 1935 and 1936, the Supreme Court issued several significant rulings against the 
administration, which included gutting “the two premier initiatives of the First New Deal.”23 The 
first of these significant rulings declared that the administrative code-writing in the National 
Industrial Recovery Act was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the executive 
branch of government. The second decision held that the Agricultural Adjustment Act’s taxing to 
regulate commodity production was an unconstitutional intrusion of federal power in violation of 
the tenth amendment.24 After the president caustically criticized the Court for relegating the 
nation to a “horse-and-buggy definition of interstate commerce” in an NIRA decision, Steve 
Early, Roosevelt’s press secretary, urged caution.25 The court followed with a seventeen-month 
string of mostly setbacks. The judiciary response to federal and state initiatives designed to 
remedy the conditions caused by the Great Depression climaxed with the Morehead v. Tipaldo 
ruling at the end of the 1936 Supreme Court term. The Hughes Court ruling struck down a New 
York minimum wage law directed at protecting women and children, and provoked widespread 
public condemnation of the Supreme Court in the midst of the 1936 campaign.26 
The president restrained his criticism until after the 1936 election while his 
administration pondered a constitutional or legislative response to overcome the Court’s 
opposition to the New Deal. It was politically risky for Roosevelt to attack the Supreme Court 
and accuse them of obstruction. It was also risky for Landon to vilify the popular president for 
                                               
23 Himmelberg, Great Depression, 41. 
24 Ibid., 41, 51; Parrish, Hughes Court: Justices, 282-283; Schwartz, A History, 232; 
Feldman, Scorpions, 106. 
25 Irons, A People’s History, 303-306. 
26 Parrish, Hughes Court: Justices, 284; Shesol, Supreme Power, 221-222; Simon, FDR 
and Chief Justice, 288-289; Irons, A People’s History, 297: Note: A wide range of state laws 
responding to the Great Depression collectively termed the “Little New Deal” paralleled the 
Roosevelt administration’s legislation. 
8 
not respecting the Court during the campaign. Although obstruction of New Deal programs had 
generated intense public reaction, the Supreme Court remained a hallowed institution in the 
minds of many Americans. The strategy of silence appeared to work for the president. After 
January 1936, poll numbers increased, and in the spring the findings of a Senate committee 
investigating campaign practices discredited the Liberty League and affiliated organizations 
opposed to Roosevelt’s re-election.27 
Yet, the administration considered the Supreme Court’s long-standing jurisprudence a 
serious threat to the New Deal during a second Roosevelt presidential term.28 The country 
remained focused on the consequences of a potential confrontation between the executive and 
judicial branches occurring after the election. Media frenzy had reacted to Roosevelt’s criticism 
of the NIRA decision in May 1935. Time magazine speculated the administration had floated a 
trial balloon to gauge public sentiment favoring “a constitutional amendment giving the Federal 
Government centralized powers which it has never had.”29 
During the 1936 political campaign, the role of the Supreme Court in addressing New 
Deal legislation figured prominently in newspaper columns, speeches by party notables, and 
during the political conventions. Herbert Hoover warned Republican delegates that a re-elected 
Roosevelt, with his ability to nominate justices, posed an existential threat to American liberty. 
The GOP platform supported state laws protecting child and women’s labor within the 
boundaries already provided by the Constitution. But Governor Landon then undercut his own 
                                               
27 Irons, A People’s History, 304-306; Shesol, Supreme Power, 215-226; Simon, FDR 
and Chief Justice, 294-298; Feldman, Scorpions, 89; Rodell, Nine Men, 247. 
28 Shesol, Supreme Power, 2; Schwartz, A History, 233; Simon, FDR and Chief Justice, 
298, 318; Franklin D. Roosevelt, FDR Speech: “Fireside Chat on Reorganization of the 
Judiciary” March 9, 1937, accessed July 1, 2015, http://docs.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/030937.html. 
29 Irons, A People’s History, 303-304; Shesol, Supreme Power, 150-151; Quote from 
Shesol, Supreme Power,151. 
9 
party’s position affirming the effectiveness of the legal status quo by advocating a constitutional 
amendment providing state governments authority if needed to protect labor.30 Landon finally 
attacked the president’s position on the Court during the last weeks of the campaign for not 
respecting the Supreme Court and the Constitution. The governor charged that Roosevelt posed a 
future threat to the judicial system because of a willingness to tamper with the Supreme Court by 
either constitutional amendment or legislative action.31  
Landon’s call for a constitutional amendment at the Republican national convention 
supporting future state laws protecting minimum wage pressured the opposition. With their 
convention platform, Democrats responded with a vaguely worded directive endorsing a 
“clarifying” amendment in the event the Supreme Court continued to obstruct New Deal 
legislation. The amendment would not presume to create new authority for Congress or the 
states, but only force the Court to recognize those legislatures’ time-honored powers.32 At the 
Democratic Convention, speakers passionately lauded the New Deal. In the process, the party 
relieved Roosevelt of the need to criticize the Supreme Court by charging it with being out of 
touch with the suffering of the people. On the campaign trail, the president proved adept at 
shifting focus from direct criticism of the Supreme Court to focusing positively on the benefits of 
the New Deal for the American people.33 But speculation persisted about what FDR might do to 
reshape the Supreme Court during a second term, and Landon raised the question in the closing 
                                               
30 Gordon Lloyd, ed., Herbert Hoover speech: “Crisis to Free Men,” Republican 
National Convention, June 10, 1936. In The Two Faces of Liberalism: How the Hoover-
Roosevelt Debate Shapes the 21st Century, (Salem, MA: M & M Scrivener Press, 2007), 
273; Irons, A People’s History, 310-312; Shesol, Supreme Power, 228. 
31 Irons, A People’s History, 311-312; Shesol, Supreme Power, 236-237. 
32 Shesol, Supreme Power, 233-235. 
33 Ibid.; Simon, FDR and Chief Justice, 294-298. 
10 
weeks of the campaign.34 In the aftermath of the public’s 1936 electoral endorsement of 
Roosevelt and his New Deal, the president resumed his confrontation with the Supreme Court.  
Roosevelt was aware that his reform momentum created by the mandate of the 1936 
landslide could break down and jeopardize the passage of forthcoming New Deal legislation.35 In 
December 1936, Roosevelt began to settle on the unoriginal option that seemed most easily 
implemented. During the United States’ history, the size of the Supreme Court had been altered 
seven times by Congress.36 Ironically, the Roosevelt administration’s plan to add justices was 
inspired by a Roosevelt nemesis, Supreme Court Justice James Clark McReynolds, from an 
earlier plan put forward to reform the lower federal courts when he had served as Wilson’s 
Attorney General. 37 The Judicial Procedures Reform Act of 1937 permitted the president to 
make appointments to the Supreme Court whenever a justice had served at least ten years and 
had not retired within six months of reaching the age of seventy. 38 To deflect charges of 
politicizing the court, the Roosevelt administration presented the plan on February 5, 1937, as 
part of a broader package of reform that had a goal of augmenting the size of the federal 
judiciary at all levels to decrease congestion delaying the resolution of litigation. 39 With six 
                                               
34 Rodell, Fred. Nine Men, 243. 
35 Leuchtenburg, Supreme Court, 110. 
36 Alfred Haines Cope and Fred Krinsky, eds., 75th Cong., 1st sess., 1937, Committee 
on the Judiciary, Senate, “Reorganization of the Federal Judiciary,” in Problems in American 
Civilization: Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Supreme Court, ed. Alfred Haines Cope and Fred 
Krinsky (Boston: D.C. Heath and Company, 1952), 75; Jean Edward Smith, “Stacking the 
Court.” New York Times, July 26, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/26/opinion/ 
26smith.html?_r=0; Rodell, Nine Men, 245. 
37 Leuchtenburg, Supreme Court, 114-121. 
38 Parrish, Hughes Court, 233-234; Ibid., 134. 
39 Allan M. Winkler, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Making of Modern America (New 
York: Pearson Longman, 2006), 117-118; Brinkley, End of Reform, 19. 
11 
Supreme Court justices over seventy, the net effect of Roosevelt’s court-packing bill would 
create a potential expansion of the Supreme Court to fifteen and a shift in judicial ideology in 
favor of the New Deal.40 Until July 22, the Roosevelt administration spent its overwhelming 
popular electoral mandate in a knock-down legislative battle to expand the Supreme Court. 
Ultimately, the administration’s effort collapsed in a 70-20 Senate vote. The American people 
rejected the president’s plan as a gross overreach of executive power.41 
Paradoxically, in the absence of the court-packing bill becoming law and before 
Roosevelt appointed any justices, the Supreme Court began issuing rulings favoring the New 
Deal. After the 1936 Roosevelt landslide victory and the administration’s threatened court-
packing plan, the Supreme Court began to allow for significant and previously court-proscribed 
governmental involvement in the economy. In rapid succession, in what has been called the 
“Constitutional Revolution of 1937,” the court ended its opposition to the New Deal. In West 
Coast Hotel v. Parrish (1937), the Supreme Court reversed the liberty of contract doctrine by 
upholding a state of Washington minimum wage statute.42 Next, in National Labor Relations 
Board v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp (1937), the court held valid Congress’s power to 
regulate labor conditions under the interstate commerce clause.43 The threat to the Social 
Security Act ended with the Steward Machine Co. v. Davis (1937) decision when the Supreme 
Court ruled that the Tenth Amendment did not limit Congress’s power to tax for unemployment 
                                               
40 Leuchtenburg, Supreme Court, 117-124. 
41 Shesol, Supreme Power, 500-501, 503; Rodell, Nine Men, 247. 
42 Stephen K. Shaw, William D. Pederson, and Frank J. Williams, eds., “Biographical 
Digest,” in Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Transformation of the Supreme Court (Armonk, NY: 
M. E. Sharpe, 2004), 252. 
43 Perkins, Roosevelt I Knew, 256. 
12 
and pension purposes.44 Concurrent opinion held that the marked transformation in the court’s 
jurisprudence between March and June 1937 was directly attributable to external pressure from 
the New Deal landslide or the court-packing bill.  
When asked if the court shifted because of internal and external factors, both legal 
scholars and professional historians weigh in. Legal scholars note that the United States Supreme 
Court serves as the final arbiter of law in the federal system of governance. As such, the court 
functioned as a lightning rod throughout the New Deal’s creation and resultant court-packing 
fight. The justices’ legal disposition attracted the energies of an array of socio-political interests 
attempting to influence its New Deal decisions. A standard reference text for understanding the 
judicial process and judicial behavior, Courts, Judges, & Politics (2002), by Walter Murphy, 
Herman Pritchett, and Lee Epstein, provides a cogent outline of checks on the judicial branch 
from a perspective of scholars of law and politics. The authors’ chapter, “Limitations on Judicial 
Power,” discusses internal checks, checks by other branches of government, checks from the 
states, and checks from the people. A review of these checks provides a useful measure of the 
range of potential influences on the Hughes Supreme Court as it considered the disposition of 
New Deal cases on appeal from lower courts.45  
Judges, as citizens, internalize their personal values in deference to the stability of the 
broader democratic culture. In fact, for decades, before and after New Deal court-packing, judges 
had never advocated increasing membership of the Supreme Court in contrast to prominent 
public officials.46 As officials of a constitutional democracy, they remain mindful of the results 
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of elections. The 1936 election handed a landslide victory of historic proportions to the 
Democratic Party that could only be understood as a popular endorsement of the New Deal. In 
United States v. Butler (1936), the court ruled against the New Deal by striking down the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act which aided farmers by providing crop subsidies in return for 
reducing acreages.47 In his dissenting opinion, Justice Harlan F. Stone reminded the court’s 
majority of the will of the people: “The only check against our own exercise of power is our own 
sense of self-restraint.” Legal precedents, judicial philosophies, and the hierarchical structure of 
state and federal judiciary represent important points of engagement within the court 
representing an institutional check.48 During the court’s New Deal conflict, the Hughes court’s 
fracture over cases created ongoing tension among the justices that often proved irreconcilable in 
crafting decisions.49 
The Supreme Court is also accountable to pressure from within the government. Under 
the system of checks and balances of the U.S. Constitution, policy comes from the interactions of 
the three branches. To ensure judicial decisions are implemented, courts must rely on the 
resources of the other branches and the goodwill of the public. Throughout U.S. history, the 
executive has rarely refused to enforce decisions of the court. But presidents do attempt to enlist 
public pressure. In 1935, Roosevelt had prepared a radio address explaining why he would defy 
the anticipated decision of the court in the so-called Gold Clause Cases. The New Deal law in 
question proposed to take the United States off the gold standard, which would devalue the dollar 
and take pressure off debtors. Roosevelt only stood down when the court upheld the law by a 5-4 
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decision.50 Potentially, the legislature can exercise coercive power over the court under the 
Constitution in areas such as salary. As Alexander Hamilton wrote in Federalist 78, the judiciary 
possesses neither money, nor means to enforce its decisions. In effecting its will, the courts must 
work in relation to the actions of the executive and legislative branches of government. In 1937, 
to help break the impasse over the New Deal between the court and the Roosevelt administration, 
Congress passed a law enhancing retirement benefits for elderly justices to encourage the 
conservative Justice Willis Van Devanter to retire.51 
States can pressure the court, but only indirectly through Congress or the White House. 
To check the Supreme Court, the power of state courts, whose decisions often reflect local 
interests, can be more substantial. Typically, the Supreme Court only has time to hear a fraction 
of cases on appeal and those must involve a federal question. Thus, state judges may potentially 
avoid being reviewed and overturned by federal courts by couching the language of their 
opinions to only reference state law.52 
The public check on the court is less apparent because federal judges have life tenure. 
Studies have indicated, however, that judges’ rulings show a degree of consistency with the 
actions of public officials as a whole. Moreover, when a clear majority of the public on an issue 
exists, over 60 percent of the court’s decisions reflect the poll numbers. Indeed, decisions over 
time still require the legitimacy conferred by public approbation. In point of fact, the historical 
record shows the 1937 Hughes Supreme Court switched its jurisprudence from laissez faire to 
support for the New Deal program of governmental intervention in the economy at a time when 
the court had both lagged behind an electoral mandate and been the object of intense public 
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controversy. Burt Solomon, journalist and author, summarized the storm raised by Roosevelt’s 
court-packing proposal in FDR v. The Constitution (2009), writing “that for the next 168 days, 
the fight over expanding the court played out over the radio airwaves, across dinner tables all 
over America, and inside the august and serene chambers of the nation’s capital.”53 
Constitutional scholars have identified distinct checks influencing the actions of the 
Supreme Court. Broadly considered, these influences fall into two general categories: internal 
and external. The internal checks originate within the judiciary. They are self-imposed restraints 
to action reacting especially to the views of the other branches of government, colleagues, and 
the public. External checks originate outside the judiciary. They are restraints to action imposed 
on the court from outside intended to obtain an outcome favorable to the outside interest. 
External interests already identified here are the other branches of the Federal government, the 
states, and the public.  
Professional historians employ a similar structure delineating internal and external 
checks. To better understand the 1937 shift in the Hughes Court’s jurisprudence, historian Laura 
Kalman, concisely delineates the two views: 
Externalists argue for the importance of politics, making the case that Roberts and 
Hughes, and therefore the court, dramatically changed course during the “constitutional 
revolution of 1937” because of the threat posed by the 1936 election and/or the court-
packing plan. Internalists highlight the primacy of law over politics, pointing to doctrinal 
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changes that began well before 1937 and continued afterward, to say that there were 
plausible intellectual reasons for the court’s journey and that no sudden shift took place.54  
Kalman was a participant in the 2005 American Historical Association Forum, “The 
Constitution, the Supreme Court, and the New Deal,” where historians hashed out the 
controversy. Another participant in the AHA Forum was Columbia University’s Alan Brinkley 
who held that the Roosevelt Administration’s coercion pushing the Hughes Court’s to shift 
represented the academy’s consensus position until the 1990s. Cumulative historiography 
since the 1930s, however, finds an exclusively external explanation too simplistic to account 
for change in the Hughes court’s judicial decision-making. More recent historical analyses 
include the idea that long-term causality precipitated Justice Roberts’s and Justice Hughes’s 
switch. The change began when a majority of justices, in the words of New Deal historian 
Michael Parrish, “emancipated” rather than “constrained” governmental influence going forward 
in the economy.55 In the expanded historical view, President Roosevelt’s push to pack the 
Supreme Court, although triggered by the impasse between the Hughes court’s jurisprudence and 
the Roosevelt administration’s New Deal programs, originated in the Supreme Court’s long-held 
judicial philosophy resisting governmental intrusion into public commerce.56  
By applying jurisprudence limiting state economic influence with roots deep in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to Roosevelt’s first term as president, the Supreme Court 
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ruled significant New Deal legislation unconstitutional.57 Twelve New Deal measures were 
defeated by the court in a seventeen-month period in 1935-1936, leaving the constitutionality of 
remaining New Deal legislation in doubt.58 Beginning with Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United 
States (1935) striking down the National Industrial Recovery Act’s attempt to regulate wages 
and hours (the first major piece of New Deal legislation), and continuing with United States v. 
Butler (1936), ruling inoperative critical provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act’s use of 
taxing power to regulate agricultural production, the Supreme Court represented an ominous 
threat to the New Deal agenda.59 In these and other cases, four conservative justices, Willis Van 
Devanter, James McReynolds, George Sutherland, and Pierce Butler (the so-called “Four 
Horsemen”) prevailed in combinations, often with swing voters Justice Owen Roberts and Chief 
Justice Charles Hughes against Justices Harlan Stone, Louis Brandeis, and Benjamin Cardozo, 
who usually supported New Deal legislation. Given the court majority’s faithfulness to precedent 
regarding the economy, the Roosevelt administration believed the Supreme Court’s continued 
course of action could block its legislative efforts to deal effectively with critical societal 
problems stemming from the Great Depression.60 
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The highly charged controversy generated contemporaneous analysis, anticipating the 
unfolding chronology of court-packing historiography. In 1936, Robert E. Cushman, a political 
scientist, in a prescient article published in Amherst College’s Problems in American Civilization 
series (1952 edition), summarized the challenge to the Roosevelt administration’s legislative 
agenda from its ideological impasse with the Supreme Court by posing timely questions. 
Cushman asked if the Constitution met the demands of contemporary America. More to the 
point, did the Supreme Court’s focus on preserving the Constitution obstruct its normal and 
healthy expansion? Cushman laid out four positions “an intelligent citizen might take” in 
response to those questions based on the then-current understanding of the country’s dire societal 
situation: 1) the Constitution is fully adequate to meet present needs and the Supreme Court is 
performing its duty admirably—change is not needed and will be resisted; 2) the Constitution is 
fully adequate to meet the serious challenges facing the country with the flexibility built into the 
Constitution’s broad and generous clauses—the body politic through criticism and 
encouragement rather than “tinkering” must convince the court to assume an activist stance in 
liberally interpreting the Constitution; 3) the Constitution is fully adequate to meet the present 
needs of the country, but the Supreme Court has at times both exceeded and/or misused its 
authority in opposing legislative initiative —the court must be reformed; 4) the Constitution 
must be changed to meet today’s needs—for example, the commerce clause, taxing clause, and 
other clauses, delimited by constitutional amendment, would be put beyond the purview of the 
Supreme Court.  
                                                                                                                                                       
“exhibited considerable hostility to federal and state laws enacted to relieve economic distress 
among farmers, workers, businessmen, municipal governments, and taxpayers. Invoking a 
variety of rubrics—the commerce clause, due process, equal protection, privileges and 
immunities, the Tenth Amendment, and excessive delegation of legislative authority—they 
sent numerous laws to the constitutional graveyard.”; Parrish, Hughes Court: Justices, 12-15. 
19 
Cushman also identified five contemporary plans for reform: 1) pack the court with 
liberals who support the New Deal legislative program; 2) use statute to limit or eliminate the 
court’s power of review by subjecting appellate jurisdiction to “such exceptions and under such 
regulations as the Congress shall make” as provided for in the Constitution; 3) pass a 
constitutional amendment requiring the Supreme Court to find by super-majority (such as seven 
to two) when declaring acts of Congress unconstitutional; 4) by statute, give the houses of 
Congress (with two-thirds majorities) the authority to override decisions of the Supreme Court; 
and finally, 5) pass a constitutional amendment removing from the Supreme Court the right of 
judicial review.61 Dating back to 1933, the Roosevelt administration anticipated conflict with the 
Supreme Court over the New Deal program and considered in some form most of the options in 
Cushman’s article. Changing the composition of the court was always contemplated and on the 
table. Plans to neutralize opposition from the court by limiting jurisdiction and passing 
constitutional amendments were pondered as well, by the president and his allies in the cabinet, 
and systematically in a study conducted within the Attorney General’s office.62  
The Roosevelt administration eventually discarded both the prospective jurisdiction and 
amendment solutions to limit the scope of court activity as too problematic. Eliminating all 
constitutional questions from the judicial branch’s review in New Deal legislation would be 
virtually impossible. Even if appellate jurisdiction could be legislated away from the Supreme 
Court on constitutional issues, hostile lower courts could still hold sway with original 
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jurisdiction.63 Constitutional revision would be difficult to draft and pass as evidenced by the 
proposed child-labor amendment still lingering unrealized for over a decade.  
Leonard Baker’s book, Back to Back: The Duel between FDR and the Supreme Court 
(1967), detailed the now well-known steps leading the Supreme Court and the Roosevelt 
administration into both conflict and resolution over the New Deal: adverse court decisions that 
culminated in the court-packing bill, and how the Supreme Court sought to counter the political 
pressure bearing on it.64 Significantly, Baker’s book signaled a developing trend in historical 
reporting on the court battle – the “duel” related a fully drawn account between not only external 
push from the administration, but also internal push-back from the court. Chief Justice Hughes 
conspired with Justices Brandeis and Van Devanter and Democratic Senator Burton Wheeler of 
Montana to discredit the administration’s charge that the judiciary needed more judges to remedy 
inefficiency owing to an ongoing backlog of cases. Purporting to represent the sentiments of the 
entire Supreme Court and directed to the Senate Judiciary Committee, Hughes sent a letter co-
signed by Brandeis and Van Devanter rejecting the claim the court was overburdened and 
contending more justices would actually lead to more consultation and therefore less 
efficiency.65 Likewise, another New Deal opponent, Republican Senator William Borah of 
Idaho, teamed with Van Devanter. Together, they timed the announcement given to individual 
Judiciary Committee members of Van Devanter’s retirement from the Supreme Court before the 
Judiciary Committee voted to recommend the court-packing bill. Obstructionist judges such as 
Van Devanter caused senators to favor enlarging the court. With Van Devanter’s resignation, a 
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powerful reason to alter the size of the court was lost. Consequently, the administration failed to 
get a do pass recommendation out of committee on the court-packing bill.66  
Baker also made the case that Justice Roberts’s presidential aspirations may have 
factored into his changing from opponent to supporter of the New Deal agenda. In early 1936, 
political commentators speculated that the Republican Party would reach into the Supreme Court 
and nominate Roberts to capitalize on voter sentiment siding with the court’s opposition to the 
New Deal. But instead, the Republicans selected Kansas governor Alf Landon as their standard-
bearer which resulted in a Roosevelt landslide of historic proportions. In the aftermath of the 
1936 election, Roberts realigned his position and began supporting the liberal bloc on the court. 
From previously voting against New York’s right to control minimum wages, Roberts now voted 
for the state of Washington’s right to control minimum wages. Roberts’s switch marked the 
beginning of a liberal majority on the Hughes court.  
The court’s shift became public with the West Coast Hotel v. Parrish decision (1937) 
when a convalesced Justice Stone joined Roberts in the 5-4 majority. The decision affirmed the 
state and federal government’s right to set minimum wages the day after the Democratic 
congressional leadership had introduced the court-packing bill in February 1937. In the interim, 
between Roosevelt’s and the Democrat Party’s overwhelming November 1936 electoral victory 
and the administration’s court-packing bill announcement in February, Justice Roberts had gone 
over to the liberal bloc.67 What went unnoticed was the case had been argued and voted in 
conference the previous January, leaving historians disputing ever since whether Roberts’s and 
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the Hughes court’s conversion in judicial philosophy was coerced or voluntary. Roberts’s now 
apparent judicial independence augured well for sustaining the New Deal.68 
Alternately, an emerging segment of historians determined Roosevelt had squandered his 
opportunity for true reform resulting from the court’s ideological shift. Beginning in the 1960s, 
New Left historians agreed with the dominant post-war view that political pressure created the 
revolution in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in the 1930s. These historical insurgents 
differed, however, in their critical assessments of the Roosevelt administration’s legacy 
regarding societal impacts apart from the court’s change in judicial philosophy. Many of these 
revisionist historians argued New Deal programs failed to significantly improve the lives of the 
poor and minorities. While deeming the New Deal a conservative, if not a failed response to the 
Great Depression, they acknowledged, but largely steered clear of the long-standing consensus 
view, that politics drove the New Deal court controversy.69  
Michael Parrish’s 1976 comprehensive review of the historiography of the Hughes court 
recognized a more nuanced accounting of historical strands. Parrish’s retrospective article, “The 
Hughes Court, the Great Depression, and the Historians,” described post-war writing on the 
Hughes court as limited and uneven in scholarship. The study sorted out schools of interpretation 
of the New Deal court controversy, adding complexity to an already bifurcated organizational 
matrix, beginning in the 1930s, of historical commentators either supporting or opposing 
Roosevelt and the New Deal. Parrish’s commentary listed New Deal historians and 
commentators in broadly oriented analytical classifications. Edward Corwin, Thomas Reed 
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Powell, Robert Stern, Benjamin Wright, and their followers formed a realist position 
“overwhelmingly sympathetic to Roosevelt’s objectives.” Parrish believed they collectively 
exhibited a healthy skepticism to employing a scientific basis for Supreme Court justices’ 
constitutional interpretation, attributing instead personal motivations (especially Hughes and 
Roberts) in reaching court decisions.70 Furthermore, Parrish determined historians Arthur M. 
Schlesinger, Jr. and William E. Leuchtenburg in the liberal, orthodox camp concurred with these 
realists because of the Hughes Court’s conflict with their pro-New Deal economic sympathies.71 
Parrish categorized Merlo J. Pusey and Samuel Hendel as scholars who echoed the view of the 
Liberty League (a politically conservative organization opposed to the New Deal) that Roosevelt 
created a “constitutional impasse.” Parrish identified their individually written biographies of 
Hughes (both dated 1951) as equating law to science, with the Supreme Court regarded as the 
unbiased mediator of constitutional interpretation. In addition, he identified Paul Freund, Paul L. 
Murphy, and William F. Swindler’s positions as following Pusey and Hendel in criticizing the 
New Deal supporters for overreaching in their “constitutional claims, their sloppy legal 
preparations, and the willingness of the court to sanction experimental legislation at the state 
level.” These later conservative New Deal critics continued to support the decisions of the 
Hughes court as uniformly non-partisan and highly reasoned.72  
Parrish confirmed that New Left-revisionist historians since the 1970s had concentrated 
their attention on excoriating perceived limitations of the New Deal instead of focusing on the 
constitutional issues that had concerned their historical predecessors. He cited Barton Bernstein, 
Howard Zinn, and Harold Radosh’s writings as examples indicting the Roosevelt administration 
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for failing to secure economic justice or improve racial equality, but completely ignoring the 
Hughes court. He mentioned Paul Conkin for appraising the court as a useful check on 
presidential ambition. Parrish lamented the revisionists’ myopic reading of the Great Depression 
through critical lenses cast upon the Roosevelt administration and thereby missing the Hughes 
court’s remarkable advances in the areas of civil and criminal rights against the accumulated 
power of the state, which ironically would have bolstered their claim that the New Deal was in 
Bernstein’s words “profoundly conservative.” Parrish concluded that revisionists regarded the 
court as opposing “the New Deal, the liberals, and the rise of the welfare state for all the wrong, 
conservative reasons.”73  
For roughly a half-century, historians and other social scientists, including New Left-
revisionists, had explained the Hughes court’s flip from opponent to supporter of New Deal 
legislation as a response to intense outside political pressure. Barry Cushman explained the 
origin of the dominant view in his book, Rethinking the New Deal Court (1998). Emerging out of 
the immediate post-war era, Cushman wrote, consensus scholars ascribed external political 
motives for the turnaround—the court responded to pressure generated by the Roosevelt-led 
Democratic landslide victory in 1936 coupled with the 1937 court-packing bill. The court-
packing bill, if passed, would have allowed the president to enlarge the court with appointees of 
his choosing. In short, historical convention maintained the court flipped its position on the New 
Deal program to ensure its integrity from external intervention.74 
Today, historians still agree that a major shift occurred in the 1930s in the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence regarding the constitutionality of extensive governmental involvement in 
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the economy and the private lives of citizens. Now, a contending internalist school emerging in 
the 1990s has asserted an alternative interpretation to the long-standing external consensus 
view.75 Laura Kalman, in her 2005 AHR Forum article, “The Constitution, The Supreme Court, 
and the New Deal,” identified a point of origin for why “Internalists” maintain court members 
shifted their positions. After Justice Roberts’s death, Justice Frankfurter and Chief Justice 
Hughes released a memorandum of Justice Roberts asserting that neither he nor Hughes was 
influenced by political pressure. Rather, both justices maintained that their New Deal judgments 
beginning with the 1937 court term were reconcilable with their pre-1937 judicial positions.76  
In her article, Kalman reported historians today use the terms external or internal as the 
basis for understanding the conflict over the court—the labels becoming self-referential 
“shorthand” for historians and other social scientists. Protagonists, debating why the Supreme 
Court shifted, now use the terminology to identify themselves instead of applying the names to 
schools of history. “Externalists” have long made the case that politics pressured Justice Roberts 
and Chief Justice Hughes shifting direction during the “Constitutional Revolution of 1937”: 
Roosevelt’s 1936 landslide victory and the court-packing bill in early 1937 exerted pressure on 
the justices. “Internalists” have contended that the shift in constitutional direction was 
evolutionary rather than revolutionary, originating considerably before 1937 and continuing well 
afterward. Changes in legal doctrine were prompted not by politics, but by the Supreme Court’s 
ongoing application of constitutional principles to the government’s role in the economy during 
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an era of profound change.77 G. Edward White traced these terms’ etymological course in his 
AHR article, “Constitutional Change and the New Deal:The Internalist/Externalist Debate”: 
The term “internalist,” long established in philosophy, began to be applied to 
historiographical debates in legal history in the 1980s. By 1994, Barry Cushman had 
applied the term externalist to one line of historical work on constitutional change in the 
1930s.78  
Historians have since employed the recent internalist/externalist lexicon as an interpretive 
frame for the Hughes court historiography. Allen Winkler, in his biography of Roosevelt (2006), 
cited the works of externalist William E. Leuchtenburg and internalist Barry Cushman as two 
outstanding books on court-packing and its consequences for reform.79 Leuchtenburg has been 
writing on the New Deal since the early 1960s. Alan Brinkley, in his 2005 AHR Forum article, 
on “The Debate over the Constitutional Revolution of 1937,” referred to him as “the most 
eminent proponent of the earlier view of a court responding to political threats.”  Brinkley noted 
the internalist G. Edward White as one “among the group of scholars now challenging the 
traditional ‘switch in time [saves nine]’” position: 
The [court-packing] plan created a political firestorm and did considerable damage to the 
president’s standing within his own party and among the public. But according to more 
than a generation of scholars, it also frightened the justices themselves, at least one of 
whom, Owen Roberts, appeared to switch positions in response to the growing political 
pressure and to begin supporting New Deal legislation. Since many of the anti-New Deal 
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decisions of the court prior to 1937 had been the result of 5-4 decisions, Robert’s shift 
proved decisive in changing the balance of the justices. This “switch in time,” as a 
columnist allegedly quipped in the 1930s, had “saved nine,” dooming Roosevelt’s court-
packing plan, but also removing the court as an obstacle to New Deal legislation.80  
In contrast to the earlier view of the Supreme Court yielding to outside pressure, White 
offered an up-to-date perspective that accounted for a gradual adjustment of judicial doctrine to a 
rapidly changing American society.81 Leuchtenburg, Kalman, and others have expressed 
dissatisfaction with the limits imposed by labels while acknowledging the prevailing shorthand 
of using antonyms to classify an entire area of historiography. Leuchtenburg complained that his 
identification with the term externalist suggests a one-dimensional political rendering of the 
courts and laws. He contended that the adoption of a verbal dichotomy reflects neither his 
position nor by implication his internalist counterparts. Though objecting that reduction by 
binary division can over-simplify complexity extant in positions on court-packing, both writers 
did extol the terms’ convenience.82  
Leuchtenburg has surmised that on some important matters related to the court 
controversy there is little that divides “externalists” and “internalists.” He has stated that in the 
international arena the court and the president operated in tandem. Also, Leuchtenburg has stated 
both externalists and internalists have dated the incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the 
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Fourteenth Amendment (especially germane in examining the court’s application of the “liberty 
of contract” standard in labor cases) as beginning before 1937. Regarding the constitutional shift 
of the court during the 1930s, Leuchtenburg recognized an area of uncertainty because of 
missing documentation. Evidence in Justice Roberts’s personal papers that could potentially shed 
light on his voting in New Deal era cases has never been found. Further, the 1937 diary of Felix 
Frankfurter (Roosevelt advisor at the time and later Supreme Court justice) that could illuminate 
the activity of the court during that transforming year was stolen from the Library of Congress.83 
Resolving to determine the most likely reason(s) the court shifted in the 1930s, 
Leuchtenburg offered four possibilities that could account for the change. First, Roberts and 
Hughes shifted because of the almost universal ridicule they sustained from legal scholars 
reviewing their decisions in law journals over a two-year period. Second, justices became the 
targets of public outrage. From 1935 to 1937, a plethora of court-curbing bills were introduced in 
Congress with the likelihood the legislation could be passed. Hughes and Roberts visited 
together at Roberts’s farm and engaged in extended conversation just prior to considering West 
Coast Hotel. Moreover, in a 1951 statement, Roberts admitted that the 1937 court was under 
intense pressure. Third, the 1936 election was a psychological blow to the conservatives on the 
court. The most trusted public opinion poll predicted Roosevelt’s defeat just prior to the election. 
Both Justices Van Devanter and McReynolds had expressed the view that Roosevelt stood a 
good chance of being defeated. Roosevelt’s victory was so one-sided, however, the judges were 
clearly put into a position in which their opposition to the New Deal agenda would constitute a 
rejection of the will of the public. Finally, the threat of packing the court could have intimidated 
the justices. Though Roberts switched his support in the minimum wage case before the court-
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packing bill was announced, newspapers had speculated widely that pending election results, 
FDR might expand the court.84 Throughout the campaign, however, the Roosevelt administration 
remained tight-lipped concerning a court-packing bill. 
In February, 1937, when the Roosevelt administration announced the court-packing bill, 
Leuchtenburg concluded the pressure on the court as an independent institution was unbearable. 
His view echoed leading historians of the day, such as Charles Beard, E. S. Corwin, and Richard 
Cortner, who connected the day the court-packing bill was introduced, February 5, directly to 
April 12, the day the Wagner Act was upheld. In National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & 
Laughlin Steel Corporation (1937), the administration gained for labor the right to be 
represented by unions and to bargain collectively. Leuchtenburg quoted Cortner as saying: “The 
Wagner Act cases marked the end of the ‘old Constitution’ .... The Wagner Act cases opened the 
floodgates of national power.” For added emphasis, Leuchtenburg quoted Supreme Court 
Justices David Souter and Clarence Thomas in recent cases marking 1937 as a seismic shift in 
constitutional jurisprudence. By 1936, the Supreme Court had ruled much of Roosevelt’s New 
Deal unconstitutional, but the court did not reject any New Deal legislation after the 
administration introduced the court-packing bill. Leuchtenburg concluded the “Constitutional 
Revolution of 1937” was sudden, not a gradual evolution of doctrine as the “internalists” 
maintained.85 
When evaluating the internalist view, G. Edward White posited in his 2005 AHR Forum 
article, “Constitutional Change and the New Deal: The Internalist/Externalist Debate,” that much 
agreement has existed between the externalist and internalist positions. Both sides acknowledged 
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the authority of the U.S. Constitution. Both sides recognized the authority of the Supreme Court 
to make final decisions regarding the interpretation of the U.S. Constitution. Both sides 
recognized the independence of justices with regard to tenure presuming good behavior. Both 
sides agreed the meaning of the Constitution may change over time. Also, externalists and 
internalists both believed prior court decisions were subject to more recent interpretation of the 
law.  
While acknowledging their common ground, White asserted that the major difference 
between externalists and internalists “involved how and why constitutional change takes place.” 
Externalists believed Supreme Court justices remain subject to the same influences that affect 
elected leaders. Accordingly, justices, like public officials, are influenced by their own pre-
existing ideologies. Further, justices would express concern over the immediate political and 
social outcomes resulting from their decisions. Thus, externalists have asserted short-term 
political concerns applied to judges must be regarded as a priority in their decision-making.86  
But White concluded that the externalists’ focus on familiar political considerations caused them 
to misread the judicial organizational matrix. Internalists understood the Supreme Court reached 
decisions by “collegial, deliberative, and focused ... analysis of legal doctrine.” Consequently, 
opinions of the court, whenever possible, were collective. Dissenting and concurring opinions 
were discouraged by floating draft opinions among justices and by modifying language in 
response to criticism. Further, justices relied on a doctrinal framework to both constrain their 
personal biases and guide their decision-making.  
Though the Constitution remains constant, the court’s doctrinal framework may change 
over time. Until the 1930s, the court relied on a doctrinal framework in which due process 
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provisions of the Constitution supported “liberty of contract” against the imposition of 
governmental police power based on the commerce clause meant to promote a public objective 
such as health, safety, or morals. By the 1940s, the court’s doctrinal framework presumed the 
opposite: most police power that interfered with liberty of contract was constitutional, based on 
the belief that legislatures enacted the legislation to promote health, safety, or morals.87  
White conceded that this change in court doctrine became apparent in 1937, seemingly 
sanctioning the legislative program of the later New Deal. He questioned, though, if correlation 
implies causation, by objecting that wars, depressions, and politics occurred independent of 
doctrinal change in constitutional interpretation.88 Instead, White and Leuchtenburg, along with 
the internalist and externalist camps, have identified the starting point of the internalist 
explanation for an evolution of court doctrine to the Nebbia v. New York (1934) decision.89 In 
Nebbia, Roberts, siding with a 5-4 majority, rejected the jurisprudential distinction dating back to 
the 1870s that the state could regulate private property only when it was “affected with the public 
interest.”90 According to the internalists, the court’s shift in jurisprudence became complete with 
the 1942 Wickard v. Filburn (1942) decision. In Wickard, the Supreme Court abandoned its 
distinction between direct and indirect effects of laws regarding interstate commerce. By the 
early 1940s, the Supreme Court had almost abandoned its constitutional scrutiny of commerce 
and police power, instead relinquishing to the states and national legislatures control of economic 
activity and benefits.91  
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White dismissed Leuchtenburg’s assertion that Nebbia was an anomaly followed by a 
rash of rulings against the New Deal, since none of the cases adverse to the Roosevelt 
administration in 1935-1936 except one was relevant to the doctrinal issues in Nebbia. Indeed, 
the decisions of the 1937 session of the Supreme Court appeared to be a revolutionary response 
to external pressure only when truncated in time by Leuchtenburg beginning in 1935 and ending 
in 1937. White minimized the assaults on the court identified by Leuchtenburg from the legal 
community in law journals, the plethora of proposed court-curbing bills coincident with negative 
public opinion, the smashing 1936 Democratic victory, and the court-packing bill itself, arguing 
instead that political and legislative pressure on the court occurred regularly dating back to 
Jefferson and Marshall. Moreover, the pace of constitutional change from Nebbia through 
Wickard, reflecting a wider time-frame, represented the norm, not the exception, for the Supreme 
Court. Change here, White asserted, “allow[ed] the states and Congress to regulate economic 
activity or redistribute economic benefits whenever they could advance a reason for doing so,”92 
mirroring other important doctrinal changes occurring over extended time periods such as 
abortion, executive power, slavery, and freedom of expression.93 
White went on to counter Leuchtenburg’s claim that “bad drafting” of New Deal 
legislation was an inadequate reason for the court to embrace New Deal objectives that had been 
previously rejected by the Supreme Court. He listed a number of New Deal statutes that were 
approved by super-majority after having been rewritten employing an alternate constitutional 
basis: the Connally Act responding to the “hot oil” ruling, revision of the Farm Debt Relief Act, 
revision of the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act, etc. White concluded that positive judicial 
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response to legislative redrafting in fact demonstrated the court’s adherence to its existing 
constitutional doctrine.94 Significantly, White held up several instances of voting patterns of 
Hughes court members to make the case that justices regularly ruled for or against legislative 
policies on doctrinal grounds independent of their political sympathies. For example, Brandeis 
led a unanimous court against the Frazier-Lemke Act despite favoring mortgage relief for 
farmers. Brandeis and Stone helped sustain the Gold Reserve Act despite their personal distaste 
for the law.95 
Alan Brinkley, in a chapter contribution to The New American Historiography (1997), a 
century-ending collection surveying broad themes in American history, described analyses of the 
New Deal period as relatively unchanging. In ongoing study, the New Deal has continued to be 
regarded as the formative core in the modern American national experience, moving the country 
toward closer union and democratic life. Brinkley commented that the absence of radical change 
in general interpretation, however, has not precluded gradual revision in specialized areas of 
New Deal history.96 For historians, it would seem the 2005 American Historical Review Forum 
itself, “The Debate over the Constitutional Revolution of 1937,” marked just such a realization of 
developing change in the historiography. In contrast to the 1930s, the maturing view of the court 
conflict by the 2000s required bifocal lenses; both the events and the language appeared 
different. 
From reviewing recent literature, this author is in agreement with the historians who 
participated in the 2005 AHR Forum. The academy’s interpretative trajectory and analysis of the 
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Roosevelt administration/Hughes court conflict has retained a prevailing “externalist’’ 
orientation over internalist considerations until the last two decades. But within the academy’s 
dominant matrix for comprehending the court controversy, variations in emphases persist. Two 
collections of historical commentaries from 1952 and 2004 serve to bridge the decades up to the 
2005 AHR Forum. Both collections revealed historical interpretation deeming the Hughes court 
as yielding to external as well as internal pressures in shifting its position on New Deal 
legislation. Despite a preponderance of historians who agreed that externalist explanations have 
dominated the 1937 court controversy historiography, an internally driven accounting of the 
event remained evident as well. Both collections revealed Supreme Court justices fixed on the 
implications of New Deal legislation on established constitutional doctrine. 
Amherst College’s 1952 edition of its Problems in American Civilization series, Franklin 
D. Roosevelt and the Supreme Court, compiled readings contemporary to the Hughes court’s 
tenure. Editors Alfred Cope and Fred Krinsky, in the introduction, centered the collection on a 
question: “Should Roosevelt have attempted to pack the Supreme Court?”97 Juxtaposed around 
the question can be found positions providing support for both external/political and 
internal/constitutional motivations for the court’s actions in the face of FDR’s pressure. Max 
Lerner’s essay, “The Supreme Court and American Capitalism,” charged the Supreme Court 
with buttressing capitalism: “At the heart of these polemics is the recognition that the real 
meaning of the court is to be found in the political rather than the legal realm, and that its 
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concern is more significantly with power politics than with judicial technology.”98 Lerner argued 
that no matter the source of appeal—e.g., injunction, writ of certiorari, due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment—“these clashes of interest ... are at once evidences of maladjustment 
and challenges to control. Some are concerned with the organizational aspects of capitalism, 
others with the incidence of its functioning, still others with the distribution of its flow of 
income.”99 Munn v. Illinois (1876) and Muller v. Oregon (1908) were explained as aberrations—
judicial review remained the bastion of anti-democratic forces.100 “There, behind the safe 
earthworks of natural law, due process, minority rights, the judges can in the plenitude of their 
virtue and sincerity veto and outlaw the basic social program of the majority.”101 
In the same collection, Carl Swisher’s article examined Chief Justice Hughes’s response 
to administrative agencies taking away judicial prerogative: 1) In Crowell v. Benson (1932), “he 
[Hughes] recaptured for the courts power to re-determine facts designated as ‘jurisdictional’ 
previously determined by administrative agencies”; 2) With passage of the National Industrial 
Recovery Act (1933), a mass machinery of administration was being created, enforcement 
provisions were absent; thereby allowing the president at his discretion to issue executive orders 
prohibiting interstate or international shipment of oil produced in excess of legal limits. “With 
only Justice Cardozo dissenting, the court held that the conferring of this power upon the 
                                               
98 Max Lerner, “The Supreme Court and American Capitalism,” in Problems in 
American Civilization: Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Supreme Court, ed. Alfred Haines Cope 
and Fred Krinsky (Boston: D.C. Heath and Company, 1952), 39. 
99 Ibid., 44. 
100 Ibid., 46-47. 
101 Ibid., 57. 
36 
president, without the prescription of a policy or standard to guide his decision, was an 
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.”102  
Echoes of Lerner’s external and Swisher’ s internal determinations have been reformed in 
the twenty-first century, sustaining the debate over why the Hughes court jurisprudence changed 
and thereby accommodated the New Deal legislative program. From the M. E. Sharpe Library of 
Franklin D. Roosevelt Studies, editor Stephen Shaw summarized Franklin D. Roosevelt and the 
Transformation of the Supreme Court, Volume 3 (2004) as a collection that “examines the impact 
of FDR on American law and politics primarily through his collision with and influence on the 
United States Supreme Court.”103 Again, as with the 1930s and 1940s readings in the Amherst 
College series edition (1952) discussed above, internalist/externalist positions were apparent in 
the essays pertinent to the 1937 court controversy in the M. E. Sharpe volume. Although authors 
described the externalist position to provide context, the essays supported an internalist 
interpretation of events. The collection did not seriously analyze possible external influences 
shaping the Hughes court’s decisions.104 Where the positions presented in the 1930s and 1940s 
writings, collected in the Amherst College 1952 publication, tilted in favor of an externalist 
explanation, those articles gathered in the M. E. Sharpe collection markedly leaned toward 
supporting an internalist accounting. 
In Part I of the 2004 M. E. Sharpe collection, “The Supreme Court: Image and Reality,” 
Roger Corley’s article noted that constitutional texts written within the previous two decades 
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continued to support the consensus position dating from the end of the Hughes court: the 
Supreme Court changed suddenly in 1937 brought on by the court-packing scheme.105 Barbara 
Perry and Henry Abraham’s essay, “Franklin Roosevelt and the Supreme Court: A New Deal 
and a New Image,” presented as a recurring theme the Hughes court’s preoccupation with 
preserving constitutional doctrine. In writing the majority opinion in United States v. Butler 
(1936), Justice Roberts’s concerns reflected the authors’ focus. Building on Chief Justice 
Hughes’s position against the NIRA in the 1935 “hot oil” decision, Roberts acclaimed judicial 
review: 
When an act of Congress is appropriately challenged in the courts as not conforming to the 
constitutional mandate, the judicial branch of the government has only one duty; to lay the 
article of the Constitution which is invoked beside the statute which is challenged and to 
decide whether the latter squares with the former. This court neither confirms nor 
condemns any legislative policy.106 
Roger Corley concluded in his article “Was There a Constitutional Revolution in 1937?” 
there was evolution, not revolution, in doctrine based on a statistical study of Supreme Court 
cases dating back to the 1921 term. A review of court decisions revealed increasing state 
authority over the economy. The Hughes court ruled more favorably than the Taft court by 
approximately a ten percent margin. Corley attributed the increase in the trend to Roberts’s and 
Hughes’s appointments after Taft’s death.107 Kenneth Holland’s article, “FDR and Charles Evan 
Hughes: President versus Chief Justice,” examined the antagonists’ backgrounds—the 
relationship between FDR and Hughes, their points of constitutional conflict and agreement, and 
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their shared impact on government and the courts.108 Holland asserted that in their battle over the 
New Deal, Hughes was persuaded, not coerced. The Chief Justice came to accept that the federal 
government’s power to regulate the economy was supported by the Constitution.109  
Hughes court historiography reached a developmental summit from its base 1930s 
externalist commentary with the 2005 American Historical Review Forum. Writing in her AHR 
Forum article, Kalman urged a new reading of the Hughes court/New Deal controversy—
rejecting the convenient “either/or, law or politics” interpretation employed by much of the 
academy.110 Kalman embraced instead constitutional scholar Bruce Ackerman’s position that 
“the internalists ‘are right in insisting that the New Deal did not reconstruct constitutional law 
out of thin air,’ while the externalists ‘are right in insisting the doctrinal revolution would not 
have happened without sustained presidential leadership.’”111 Alan Brinkley, in his AHR Forum 
introduction, affirmed Kalman’s counsel. Brinkley urged historians to employ a union of 
approaches, recognizing that law and politics “are really two complementary parts of the 
complex process by which the Constitution is, and has always been, interpreted by the courts.”112 
Leuchtenburg’s analytical contribution to the AHR Forum emphasized the tremendous 
political and societal pressure that the justices must have felt rendering opinions on what they 
and their fellow citizens considered to be legislation dealing with a national emergency.113 The 
use of a 1935-1937 constitutional framework, however, arbitrarily precludes realistic 
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consideration of the normal development of case law. For example, in the realm of labor law: 
Holmes for the minority in Hammer v. Dagenhart (1918) regarding federal regulation of child 
labor,114 and Brandeis in his celebrated brief in Muller v. Oregon (1908) argued for police power 
protecting women’s health, anticipated by decades the judicial change that would accompany 
governmental and societal transformation during the New Deal.115 Chief Justice Hughes in turn, 
writing for the majority, directly applied Muller in supporting minimum wages in West Coast 
Hotel v. Parrish (1937).116  
White provided documentation in his AHR Forum article, refuting Leuchtenburg’s claim 
that “bad drafting” could not justify the court’s reversals on New Deal laws previously ruled 
unconstitutional. White offered before and after comparisons, showing New Deal laws passing 
judicial review when redrafted using changed constitutional bases.117 In the 1952 Amherst 
College collection, Swisher’s description of the haste involved in creating New Deal legislation 
buttressed White’s charge of sloppy drafting.118 White’s position suffers, though, from the 
salient fact that, in examples cited, conservative and moderate Supreme Court justices changed 
their positions on the redrafted legislation in the wake of the announcement of the court-packing 
bill in February 1937. In countering Leuchtenburg, White advanced the internalist argument. He 
contended that the dynamic of the court’s constitutional framework evolved over a longer time 
frame, occurring independently of the actions of the president or the Congress in the 1930s. 
White’s summation in his 2005 AHR Forum essay argued that applying “behavioralist (external) 
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assumptions” to Supreme Court decisions became a self-fulfilling prophecy in the absence of 
recognizing the court’s standard application of “doctrinal (internal) constraint.”  
Yet, compelling political factors posed by Leuchtenburg and other externalists stand. 
Hughes and fellow justices clearly exceeded judicial norms of behavior in responding to political 
pressure. The judges conspired with Senators Wheeler and Borah to undermine the court-packing 
bill, both by offering senators an opposing assessment of the court’s efficiency and in timing the 
announcement of Justice Van Devanter’s resignation. In 1954, Justice Roberts acknowledged 
feeling outside political pressure when he received prominent consideration as a candidate for 
the Republican presidential nomination in 1936. Contemplating a run for the presidency would 
make Roberts cautious about making judicial rulings out of step with the electorate, and Baker 
noted Roberts’s philosophy wavered “during this time ... as expressed in his court opinions and 
votes, see-sawed from the liberal to the conservative side.”119 Hughes and Roberts clearly 
recognized the political winds sweeping the country around the time of the 1936 election and the 
subsequent announcement of the proposed legislation expanding the Supreme Court in February 
1937. Both Hughes’s and Roberts’s extensive careers in the higher reaches of government 
suggest strongly a practiced capability to deal with pressure from President Roosevelt and an 
overwhelmingly Democratic Congress. In response, Holland described Hughes’s ideology as 
vacillating between the liberal and conservative blocs on his court, voting equally with each side 
to maintain working relationships and to control the direction of leadership. Holland maintained, 
however, that Hughes’s accommodating ideology could not explain either his moderation or his 
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constitutional differences with Roosevelt.120 Doctrinal constraint aside, Hughes and Roberts 
exemplified both resistance and subjection in accordance with “behavioralist assumptions.” 
Did the United States Supreme Court shift jurisprudence because of pressure from the 
results of the 1936 election and the Roosevelt administration’s court-packing bill in 1937? The 
process of judicial change accelerated significantly with the Supreme Court term of 1937; even if 
internalists can mark the beginning of the court’s philosophical shift with the Nebbia v. New 
York (1934) decision confirming a state’s right to regulate commodity prices, or decades earlier, 
in minority opinions authored by Holmes and Brandeis, supporting governmental oversight of 
the conditions of private economic activity.121 Conversely, for all Leuchtenburg’s accumulated 
analysis supporting external causation for a “Constitutional Revolution of 1937,” Leuchtenburg 
himself has admitted, absent conclusive evidence such as Roberts’s or Frankfurter’s papers, “I 
don’t know for certain.”122 Kalman termed Barry Cushman’s 1998 book, Rethinking the New 
Deal Court: The Structure of a Constitutional Revolution, the full statement of the internalist 
position.123 Cushman likewise has expressed “there is no ‘utterly irrefutable smoking gun’” to 
explain the court’s shift in jurisprudence in the Constitutional Crisis of 1937.124 
In the years since Kalman’s and Brinkley’s participation in the American Historical 
Review Forum on “The Constitution, the Supreme Court, and the New Deal” (2005) discussed in 
this paper, historians, scholars in allied fields, and journalists, among others, have contributed 
useful additions to Hughes Supreme Court historiography. Recent monographs now detail 
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connections within a wide spectrum of Hughes court/New Deal topics. Noteworthy books 
include journalist Burt Solomon’s FDR v. The Constitution (2009), law professor Noah 
Feldman’s Scorpions (2010), historian Jeff Shesol’s Supreme Power (2010), and law professor 
James Simon’s FDR and Chief Justice Hughes (2012). Each interwar account adds substance to 
our historical understanding of the internal and external pressures on the Hughes Supreme Court.  
The strength of Solomon’s FDR v. The Constitution abides in its ability to render the 
social landscape of the early decades of the twentieth century and deftly place the court battle in 
it. Arcane legalisms and court cases become easily accessible to historians outside the usual 
boundaries of constitutional history.125 In Scorpions, Noah Feldman appropriated the moniker 
used by Justice Felix Frankfurter’s law clerk in the early 1950s to describe the sitting Supreme 
Court justices; by then, Roosevelt judicial appointees had begun to redefine boundaries of the 
federal government changing the fabric of American life. Feldman’s Scorpions adds significantly 
to our historical understanding of the effects of the 1937 shift in Supreme Court jurisprudence.126 
Jeff Shesol’s background as a speechwriter in the Clinton administration is evident and 
contributes to an insider feel in the recounting of the interplay of politicians, the people, and the 
courts. Supreme Power indeed follows those purveyors of power responsible for prompting 
1930s foundational societal change. Shesol’s diligence in tracking down and making good use of 
surviving on scene participants, who served as junior staffers and law clerks to principal New 
Deal actors, stands as a contribution in itself.127 James Simon gives equal treatment to Roosevelt 
and Hughes in FDR and Chief Justice Hughes. In this dual biography, Simon clearly explicates 
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how both the president and the chief justice valued and vigorously promoted their respective 
institutions as essential co-equal branches of government.128 
Almost eight decades have passed since the Roosevelt administration’s attempt at court-
packing and the subsequent “Constitutional Revolution of 1937.” Distilling from a succession of 
historians’ extended perspectives, an arc of historical understanding reveals a comprehensible 
historiography still taking shape. An external interpretive frame dominated analyses of 
contemporary and post-war Hughes court jurisprudence. Commentaries, much in evidence, 
highlight political pressures brought to bear on the Supreme Court. Progressive forces sought 
institutional change resulting in societal transformation: represented, for example, in New Deal 
writing compiled in the 1952 “Problems in American Civilization” collection, or Roosevelt’s 
biography by Leuchtenburg (1963).129 
An expanding internal interpretation for the switch in Hughes court jurisprudence was 
evident by the 1960s. Baker’s 1967 book documenting the duel between the Roosevelt 
administration and the Supreme Court typified a growing awareness of both inside and outside 
forces shaping the Hughes court’s judicial philosophy: prominently highlighted in the court fight 
when a faction of liberal, moderate, and conservative justices employed active measures to 
preserve the judicial independence of the Supreme Court by collaborating together to resist the 
pressures of the administration’s Senate court-packing push.130 From cumulative historical 
writing—political, societal, judicial—Parrish’s 1978 retrospective of court-packing 
historiography grouped historians according to their assessments of relative external and internal 
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pressures on the Hughes court. Historians questioned the Hughes court’s transformed judicial 
philosophy: did a “revolution” in historiography occur in 1937? To Parrish’s writing in 1978, 
historical analysis had come a long way from the 1930s when sympathy for or against the New 
Deal shaped Hughes court historiography.131 Parrish’s reprise of Hughes court historiography in 
1998 employed conceptualizations appropriated from schools of legal jurisprudence: legal 
formalism, judges determining the law based on legal principles; and legal realism, judges ruling 
on the law based on personal experience joined with schools of historical interpretation reflecting 
a changed emphasis of inquiry.132 
From twentieth century’s end to the present, legal scholarship has crystallized with full 
recognition of external and internal influences. Identifying the contending schools using 
objective language of historiography, Parrish distilled the differing causality of the Hughes court 
judicial philosophy, located as either a “constitutional revolution” arising from external political 
pressures or simply a “constitutional evolution” rooted in the internal logic of past decisions.”133 
With her 2005 AHR Forum paper, Kalman stressed the distinction applied to historians as well: 
“we are either ‘externalists’ or ‘internalists.’”134 Barry Cushman’s 2014 review of five 
monographs of recent New Deal era literature related to the 1937 Supreme Court decisions 
confirmed historians have continued to frame understanding of the Hughes court conflict using 
the externalist and internalist analytical matrix. Cushman, reiterating Parrish and Kalman years 
before, determined the works he evaluated represented the shift in the Hughes court as either a 
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sharp break in constitutional doctrine yielding to external pressure, or as a gradual development 
of constitutional doctrine based on internal decisions originating from the justices’ legal 
philosophies.135 
While employing the current dichotomy of externalist and internalist positions does serve 
to bring the court controversy into sharper relief, this writer has concluded neither external nor 
internal factors alone has ever satisfactorily explained the 1937 shift in Supreme Court 
jurisprudence. Focus on this contentious area of New Deal historiography confirms 
Leuchtenburg’s contention that there has always been an alternate perception to the dominant 
external explanation for the court controversy.136 Under-representation of an internal position, in 
the nascent forms of complementary biographies of Chief Justice Hughes and attacks on the 
motives of the New Deal dating back to the 1930s and 1940s, mushroomed into a fully 
developed and competing internalist position in the past two decades. For example, legal 
historians since the 1990s have argued convincingly that factors such as Justice Roberts’s 
evolving views on state regulation of private property significantly influenced constitutional 
movement between 1934 and 1942. Internalists as well have discounted external momentum 
from the 1936 election by pointing out that the Roosevelt administration also triumphed in the 
1934 off-year election only to see the New Deal program invalidated by the Supreme Court. 
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Moreover, significant state expansion of the commerce clause occurred with the arrival of 
Roosevelt appointees to the court reflecting the new justices’ internal judicial philosophies.137 
With fully developed externalist and internalist interpretive modalities established at the 
time of the 2005 AHR Forum, Kalman and Brinkley expressed hope for a synthesis of positions 
affording a more holistic explanation of the 1937 court controversy. Still, it seems certain 
historians will continue to research, debate, and frame external and internal causes for the shift in 
the Hughes court’s jurisprudence in attempting to understand it.138 Historians since the time of 
Herodotus and Thucydides have used chronology and categories to sort out human behavior. But 
to make sense of experience, Brinkley’s concluding point at the AHR Forum argues for organic 
treatment of American jurisprudence: external arguments and internal arguments “are really two 
complementary parts of the complex process by which the Constitution is, and has always been, 
interpreted by the courts.”139  
Recent New Deal/Hughes court works, Scorpions by Feldman, FDR and Chief Justice 
Hughes by Simon, and Supreme Power by Shesol support Brinkley’s contention. Fundamentally, 
these histories cohere because they explore both exterior actions and interior motives of their 
historical actors. To put it another way, using Hughes as an instructional exemplar: in the court-
packing battle over the court, the chief justice served as both an adept politician protecting the 
turf of the court and a motivated jurist applying established legal doctrine to secure a judicial 
center moderating the effects of the New Deal.140 Can historians understand Hughes or 
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139 Brinkley, “Debate over,” 1050. 
140 Feldman, Scorpions, 110, 114; Simon, FDR, 392-393; Shesol, Supreme Power, 521-
523. 
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Roosevelt without each other? Shesol concluded in Supreme Power that to consider the Supreme 
Court as exclusively a political body, or a legal institution impervious to either external or 
internal influence is a false dichotomy that has persisted antithetically in the face of human 
complexity. Appropriately, to make his case, Shesol quotes the ultimate swing voter, Justice 
Roberts, famously attempting to explain his vote in the West Coast Hotel v. Parrish decision: 
“Who knows what causes a judge to decide what he does. Maybe, the breakfast he had has 
something to do with it.”141 
The scale and influence of the federal government over American life increased 
phenomenally as a result of the New Deal.142 Interest in the Roosevelt administration battle with 
the Supreme Court will continue because of far-reaching consequences of conflict occurring in 
the decades following the New Deal: increased state and national governmental power creating 
the modern administrative state, and judicial activism affecting civil rights.143 Clearly, de 
Tocqueville had a point when he observed that political questions in the United States often end 
up in court. Odds are historians will cover their bets as they continue to assess the Roosevelt 
administration and the Hughes court. Momentous political acts and precedent setting judicial 
decisions of the 1930s redound unavoidably in the lives of the American people and turn up with 
regularity in the course of routine research. In 1992, in the Planned Parenthood v. Casey 
decision reaffirming the constitutional right to abortion, both supporting and dissenting opinions 
referenced the “lessons” of 1937. Rehnquist court justices, in an attempt to establish 
jurisprudential direction, were divided over standing by or deserting the precedent established by 
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Roe v. Wade (1973).144 In 2009, Christina Romer, chair of the Obama administration’s Council 
of Economic Advisers, in a speech at the Brookings Institution modeling the experience of the 
Great Depression as archetype, advocated continuing a massive federal stimulus program to 
recover from the 2008 economic crisis.145 In 2010, reviewers of Feldman’s book, The Scorpions, 
about Roosevelt Supreme Court appointees, drew parallels with New Deal legislation, predicting 
the Supreme Court would be faced with deciding the fate of the Affordable Care Act in the next 
few years.146 
Historians, in the future will continue to have ample opportunity to consider the New 
Deal’s huge footprint on the landscape of American history. Shesol, Kalman, and Brinkley have 
advocated an analytical revision of court-packing historiography that recognizes the 
complementary value of external and internal arguments explaining the shift in Hughes court 
jurisprudence. Given the complexity of the research area, and considering the strength of both 
external and internal explanations for the resultant change in Hughes court jurisprudence, 
increasing collaboration of the kind occurring at the 2005 AHR Forum may happen as a matter of 
course. 
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II. THE DECISION TO DROP THE ATOM BOMB ON JAPAN: A REVIEW OF  
HISTORIOGRAPHY 
 
Collective human losses in World War II, the most destructive war in world history, are 
incalculable. Deaths numbered somewhere around 50 million. No close approximation is 
possible, given the scale and geographical extent of the conflict. In areas of armed hostility, 
devastation was severe: huge swathes of habitation and infrastructure were rendered unusable, 
agriculture and industry were shattered, populations traumatized, effects on domestic and 
international institutional structures were compromised.1 The conflict’s single most destructive 
act occurred when an American B-29 bomber dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima, August 6, 
1945. In 1/10,000th of a second, the blast delivered a force of about twelve kilotons of TNT 
destroying five square miles amounting to 63 percent of the city’s buildings. Deaths totaled 
around 140,000, combining civilian and military casualties and those who later succumbed to 
radiation poisoning.2 
Leaders of the principal belligerents recognized far-reaching implications: President 
Harry Truman, returning on the navy cruiser USS Augusta from the conference of allied leaders 
at Potsdam, jubilantly responded to the bombing of Hiroshima as “the greatest thing in history;”3 
Emperor Hirohito, asking his nation to lay down arms in the aftermath of the second atomic 
attack on Nagasaki, somberly announced, “the enemy has begun to employ a new and cruel 
                                               
1 Peter Calvocoressi and Guy Wint, Total War: Causes and Courses of the Second World 
War. (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1972), 551-553. 
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bomb, the power of which to do damage is indeed incalculable.”4 Underlying and linked to 
Hiroshima, reactions from both the American president and Japanese War Minister, Anami 
Korechika, reflected a crescendo of anger between enemies. President Truman, responding to an 
appeal from the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America pleading not to use the bomb, 
again wrote:  
Nobody is more disturbed over the use of the atomic bomb than I am but I was 
greatly disturbed over the unwarranted attack by the Japanese on Pearl Harbor and 
their murder of our prisoners of war. The only language they seem to understand 
is the one we have been using to bombard them. When you have to deal with a 
beast you have to treat him as a beast. It is most regrettable but nevertheless true.5  
On August 9, Japan’s six-member Supreme Council for the Direction of the War met to 
determine a response to the Allies demand for unconditional surrender. As the government 
weighed the repercussions of the Hiroshima attack along with the Soviet Union’s declaration of 
war on Japan the night before, a second atomic bomb was dropped on Nagasaki. Defeated 
militarily, the council remained hopelessly deadlocked. In the deliberations, as opposing factions 
argued for hours over surrender, smoldering hostility, which contributed to the worst war in 
world history and culminated in the use of atomic weapons, found voice in the ironic words of 
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the War Minister, General Anami, to fight on in a now lost cause: “Would it not be wondrous, 
for this whole nation to be destroyed like a beautiful flower?”6  
Hiroshima, the ultimate act of seemingly unstoppable hostility between enemies in World 
War II, resulted in a harbinger of destruction that today threatens the existence of all humanity. 
How to make sense of war between Japan and the United States that escalated to the use of 
atomic weapons has remained an ongoing challenge for historians. Brutal warfare in the Pacific 
culminated in the United States dropping two nuclear bombs on the Empire of Japan in August, 
1945, causing the devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and death and debility for many 
thousands of Japanese. The American action helped end World War II and usher in an era of 
Cold War conflict, in the process generating a broader area of historical inquiry, including topics 
such as the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction, and 
East-West security alliances. 
 
The Decision to Use Atomic Weapons in the Context of Historiography 
The Truman Administration’s use of nuclear weapons remains one of the most 
controversial decisions in American history. Numerous historical studies have since ascribed a 
range of political, military, diplomatic, and psychological reasons for the American decision. 
Many of these studies have considered the issue of whether moral justification existed for the 
United States to use nuclear weapons against Japan. Understanding both the employment of 
weapons of mass destruction during World War II and the standing threat of use potentially 
causing incalculable damage and hastening the onset of the Cold War, remain important topics of 
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historical interest among the general public and historians today. J. Samuel Walker, for example, 
in a study of United States History college textbooks, took particular note of Gary B. Nash’s 
assertion in the textbook The American People: Creating a Nation and a Society (1990) that 
post-World War II history cannot be understood without an understanding of the Cold War and 
by extension the dropping of atomic bombs on Japan.7 Moreover, a poll of journalists in 1999 
ranked the use of nuclear weapons against Japan the top story of the twentieth century ahead of 
landing a man on the moon and the attack on Pearl Harbor.8  
Seven decades after the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, numerous studies 
continue to expand an already vast amount of literature probing the extraordinary complexity of 
this singularly transformative event. Passions have sometimes flared as historians have used a 
diverse array of interpretive approaches to realize deeper understanding of the decision to drop 
the bomb. Archetypal of ongoing, diverse historical interpretation of nuclear employment 
occurred from January 1994 to January 1995, when public controversy surrounded the National 
Air and Space Museum’s fiftieth anniversary retrospective exhibition, “The Last Act: The 
Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II” (in common parlance, the “Enola Gay exhibition” 
after the B-29 aircraft which dropped the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima and served as the 
centerpiece of the installation). Intense media attention and congressional action resulted in 
cancellation of the original exhibit.9 Subsequently, the focus of the December, 1995, issue of the 
Journal of American History was dedicated to concerns surrounding the Enola Gay controversy. 
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The issue questioned the appropriateness of politics influencing the interpretation of history, in 
particular, the totality of history from national perspectives. In compiling an objective record, 
Japanese historians faced the challenge of Japan committing the perfidy of a Pearl Harbor while 
United States historians faced the challenge of recognizing the ongoing agony of victims of the 
nuclear blasts.10 
For historians of Hiroshima, the atomic bomb decision has often become an interpretative 
dispute over national memory, a struggle for objectivity shaped by an ongoing consideration of 
relevant information.11 Revelations from the diaries and statements of Truman administration era 
officials, the disclosures of the secret cables of the Japanese government broken by United 
State’s wartime intelligence, and the opening of national archives of World War II belligerents 
have continued to command attention and influence debate as it has evolved into a new 
century.12 Today, understanding Cold War historiography generally and the decision to drop the 
bomb specifically can be broadly organized into three successive schools of thought for 
interpretative purposes from 1945 to the present time.13 The Consensus and New Left 
revisionism schools of American historiography emerging from earlier progressive interpretation 
are considered in the first part of this paper. Coverage of an emerging middle ground position 
(post-revision) of American historiography follows an examination of the principal arguments of 
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the Consensus and New Left schools regarding the use of nuclear weapons by the United States 
against Japan. Finally, the concluding section contains significant recent and ongoing 
historiographical developments related to the decision to drop the atomic bomb. 
 
Progressive School, Consensus School and New Left Revisionism 
After World War II, what has been termed a progressive analysis of history was eclipsed 
by a consensus position considering the use of nuclear weapons. Before the end of World War II, 
the progressive school interpreted history as cumulative. With the progressive model, each era 
added to history through the resolution of conflict by opposing forces whenever democratic, 
popular interests opposed entrenched, privileged groups thereby creating sectional, economic, or 
ideological outcomes. Progressivism fell out of favor after World War II because its model of 
adversarial duality advanced by Frederick Jackson Turner, Charles Beard, and Vernon 
Parrington could not adequately account for what John Higham described as a society perceived 
as increasingly homogenous, not so divided by region, class, or ethnic ties. By the 1950s, the 
progressive paradigm of domestic social conflict appeared to take too little account of the role of 
accommodation, compromise, innovation, and international influence in American life. Much 
historical scholarship instead reflected the conformity of the 1950s emphasizing “the enduring 
uniformities of American life, the stability of institutions, and the persistence of a national 
character.”14 Yet Higham’s influential historiography writings also pointed to an America on the 
cusp of profound societal change. His essays criticized “bland” consensus history as softening 
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the edges of conflict in society and turning askance from issues of social justice. In his view, 
historians risked engaging scholarship within a “moral vacuum.”15  
Another tenet of consensus history, exceptionalism, highlighted in works by Louis Hartz, 
Daniel Boorstin and David Potter in the 1950s, differentiated the United States from other 
countries because of a supposed lack of class conflict, continual material advance, and a constant 
pursuit of democratic liberalism. Exceptionalism came under increasing criticism beginning in 
the 1960s.16 In 1964, Hartz revised and diminished his earlier position by identifying 
exceptionalism in several settler societies worldwide as well as the United States. By 1995, 
George M. Fredrickson reported in a cross-national article that American exceptionalism had 
fallen into disfavor among today’s historians for the apparent reason that “the history of every 
nation has distinctive features.”17 
In an essay, “Modern American Historiography,” Carl Degler identified the second major 
school of history after World War II, New Left revisionism, as a “minor revolution” which 
transformed historians’ views of the past. Degler identified two forces that called for revision of the 
consensus view of American history: first, the social tumult of the anti-war, civil rights, women’s 
and environmental movements of the 1960s which polarized the country. The seemingly detached, 
post-war consensus interpretive model was disparaged for its inability to account for the nation’s 
evident conflict and diversity. Second, in a changing of the guard, young historians and others from 
across the social science spectrum wrote from perspectives apart from their staidly traditional 
northern European-American predecessors. Often from working class backgrounds and representing 
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a range of ethnic types, these insurgents saw diversity, not consensus as normative. They appraised 
the status of Blacks, Native Americans, Orientals, women, along with other groups on the margins 
and preferred a ‘salad bowl’ not ‘melting pot’ analogy as emblematic of a persistently non-inclusive 
America.18  
In the realm of diplomatic history, New Left revisionism’s emergence in the 1960s 
conflicted with the Realist School of American foreign relations, which had dominated the 
interpretation of United States post-World War II history. At the core of the Realists’ view, was a 
belief that a totalitarian Soviet Union’s determination to control Europe and export its 
communist ideology worldwide had created confrontation and a Cold War with the United 
States. To that end, George F. Kennan postulated that the Soviet Union was never more than an 
erstwhile ally, only siding against the Axis until the threat from Nazi Germany had ended.19 The 
New Left’s counter position, generated by disillusion with American society cast in the shadow 
of nuclear apocalypse, asserted that American capitalism was responsible for insatiable economic 
imperialism abroad dating back to the Industrial Revolution. Thus, New Left revisionists 
concluded that a bipolar world-view with the United States and its allies wearing “white hats” 
and the Soviet bloc donning “black hats” was untenable.  
Joseph Siracusa summarized the rising of New Left revisionism as a reaction to the 
prevailing consensus history: it became for most of its advocates a historiography of protest 
urging “the replacement of America’s capitalist political economy, which was considered 
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structurally expansionist and counterproductive, with a non-expansionist” near self-sufficient 
democratic socialism.20 Siracusa maintained that the New Left protest did indeed reflect a break 
with a then prevailing consensus writing of domestic history absent of conflict and diversity.21 
Ellen Fitzpatrick’s more recent research on the same period, however, posited that consensus 
historiography of the two decades following World War II, while reflecting a prevailing view of 
stability and continuity of the American past, nevertheless did not adequately account for the 
persistence of alternate historical narratives continuing from the interwar years. Despite the 
intellectual chill of McCarthyite tactics, the writings of Marxist historians Phillip Foner and 
Herbert Aptheker stood as two exemplars among numerous dissenting studies from mainstream 
historiography that she identified in areas of civil liberties, political dissent, minorities, class, and 
gender written in the post-war period.22  
In the area of diplomatic history, Siracusa’s study aligned with Fitzpatrick’s domestic 
findings. Siracusa stated that the novelty of New Left 1960s revisionism confronting a unified 
consensus school was misplaced because considerable disagreement had characterized historical 
discussion in international relations since the turn of the twentieth century. As examples, 
Siracusa cited Scott Nearing’s searing 1920s criticism of an expanding American empire; and 
coming over a decade and a half before Gar Alperovitz’s 1965 atomic diplomacy polemic, 
British physicist P.M.S. Blackett’s insight that dropping atomic bombs on Japan were not the last 
acts of World War II as much “as the first act of the cold diplomatic war with Russia in 
progress.”23  
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Generally, consensus historiography served as a broad category for understanding 
American society in the Cold War period and was framed principally by the World War II 
generation. Meanwhile, the New Left revisionism historiography of a succeeding generation of 
historians emerged out of the tumult of the 1960s and 1970s as both an effort to explain that 
period’s landscape and as an opportunity to reinterpret the past. Various historians deemed the 
creation and use of atomic weapons as the point of no return in terminating the Soviet-American 
wartime alliance. William Appleman Williams emerged in the 1950s as an early revisionist of the 
then dominant Consensus school. Taking a lead from the progressive historians Beard and Turner, 
Williams inspired many of the new generation of New Left historians by framing the American 
drive for markets in East Asia as a natural extension of Turner’s thesis of westward expansion. 
Williams described America’s first use of nuclear weapons as the “new and awesome power in 
keeping with traditional Open Door policy which crystallized the Cold War.”24 D. F. Fleming, 
another important early revisionist and “an advocate of Wilsonian internationalism,”25 termed the 
use of the atomic bomb “the beginning of the post-war balance of power struggle” with the Soviet 
Union.26 By the 1960s, an interpretive divide became evident across the American historical 
spectrum; this break was no less evident regarding the United States decision to employ nuclear 
weapons against the Empire of Japan at the close of World War II.  
In the mid-1970s, Barton Bernstein, himself a revisionist, reported no agreement between 
the Consensus and New Left revisionist schools regarding either the origins of the Cold War or 
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the use of nuclear weapons. Bernstein’s editorial commentary appeared in the introduction of an 
influential thirty-year retrospective, The Atomic Bomb: The Critical Issues (1976).27 Conrad 
Crane, a military historian, in his writing on the air campaign against Japan, labeled Bernstein’s 
compilation of documents and essays the most thorough and balanced treatment of the events 
and positions surrounding the employment of the atomic bomb to date. For more recent 
historiography, Crane judged Samuel Walker’s essay, “The Decision to Use the Bomb: A 
Historiographical Update (1990),” of similar benefit to historians.28  
Bernstein’s four-part collection of documents and essays began with a section on the 
official American position. Part I, titled “The Official Explanation: Statement and Challenge,” 
contained a range of viewpoints. President Truman declared after Hiroshima that the bomb was 
used to save the lives of many thousands of young Americans. Secretary of War Henry Stimson 
defended the use of the bomb in an early article in Harper’s (1947). He asserted that “the use of 
both bombs was necessary for ending the war promptly; Japan was near defeat but not near 
surrender.”29 This section included minutes of the Interim Committee’s report as well. The 
committee, composed of government officials, academics, and industrialists, was charged by 
Truman to make a recommendation on the use of the bomb. On June 1, 1945, after consultation 
with an adjunct “Scientific Advisory” panel, the committee proposed to Truman that the bomb 
be used without prior warning as soon as possible on a military target with surrounding buildings 
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and houses that would be highly vulnerable to damage.30 The first section ends with significant 
dissent from nuclear employment. The Franck Report of some top Manhattan project scientists 
urged the administration to give the Soviet Union prior notice and that bombing Japan should 
take place only after a non-combat demonstration. The report warned that to do otherwise would 
create a nuclear arms race with Russia with potentially grave consequences. Joseph Grew, long-
term former ambassador to Japan, speculated that had the allies categorically allowed for the 
retention of the Japanese emperor rather than the call for an unconditional surrender in the 
Potsdam Declaration, “the atom bomb might never have had to be used at all.”31  
Part two of Bernstein’s collection asked the question “Was the Bomb Necessary?” In the 
immediate aftermath of World War II, a Fortune magazine poll showed the atomic bombing of 
Japan to be tremendously popular with the American public.32 By 1946, however, prominent 
citizens Norman Cousins and Thomas Finletter had already proposed publicly that the real 
reason for bombing Japan was to intimidate the Soviet Union.33 This section featured the 
opposing viewpoints of two military analysts. Hanson Baldwin, a New York Times World War II 
military writer, in an abridgement from his book, Great Mistakes of the War, (1950) reasoned 
that bombing Japan was unjustified because Japan was essentially already defeated. The U.S. 
Navy had imposed a blockade choking resource poor Japan—all sectors of economic and 
military production were imploding from saturation bombing, and the United States was aware 
through intelligence gained from breaking encrypted wireless radio codes that the Japanese were 
trying to surrender. Baldwin concluded, however, that unconditional surrender was a culturally 
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impossible demand for the Japanese to meet without provision for the continuance of the ruling 
dynasty.34 Baldwin’s argument was countered by Admiral Samuel Morison’s article reprinted 
from the Atlantic Monthly (1960). Morison wrote that despite Japan’s dire condition in August 
1945, a factional impasse prevailed within the Japanese government. Peace had been stalled by a 
hard-line party within the Japanese cabinet and military. Morison argued that the shock of the 
atomic bombs was necessary to give the emperor necessary moral suasion within the government 
and military for what he and his Prime Minister Kantaro Suzuki had worked at for months—
surrender. The military in Morison’s estimation retained the capacity to resist a homeland 
invasion. The result of delaying first use of employing atomic bombs against Japan would be a 
high loss of life to both sides and a strong probability the Soviets would be a part of the invasion 
force resulting in a divided post-war Japan. The willingness of the Japanese to fight on was 
confirmed by the fact that even after the atomic bombs had fallen, the Soviets had declared war 
on Japan and the decision for surrender had been taken, a fanatical officer clique nearly 
succeeded in a palace coup to overthrow the government and impose its will through physical 
control of the emperor.35 The section concludes with the 1946 U.S. military’s Strategic Bombing 
Survey, which noted the paralyzing division within the Japanese government. Nonetheless, the 
Survey determined a high probability existed that Japan would have been forced to surrender of 
necessity by November 1, 1945—without a military invasion of Japan and regardless of whether 
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in August of 1945 atomic bombs had been used and the Soviet army had begun to shred Japanese 
forces in Manchuria.36  
Parts three and four of the compilation, “Why Was the Bomb Used?” and “Atomic 
Diplomacy and the Moral Significance of Hiroshima,” considered specific points of contention 
between schools of historical interpretation on the decision to use atomic weapons. Crane’s 
military history highlighted Bernstein’s survey of the then complex state of atomic bomb 
historiography by focusing on Bernstein’s commentary regarding Soviet-American rivalry:  
Whether anti-Soviet purposes constituted the primary reason for using the bomb [as 
Alperovitz’s book also argues], or a secondary but necessary reason [(as some others 
think), or a confirming but not essential reason (as I contend)] is the general range of the 
ongoing dispute about why the bombs were used.37  
 
Historiographical Impasse: Consensus versus New Left Revisionism 
Bernstein’s conclusion in his introduction to The Atomic Bomb: The Critical Issues 
appeared well founded; the 1976 retrospective demonstrated that historians did not agree on the 
causes of the Cold War, or the controversy surrounding the use of nuclear weapons. The debate 
over Truman’s decision to drop the bomb only intensified with bitter acrimony during the 
controversy over the Enola Gay exhibition marking the fiftieth anniversary of the bombing of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Across that time frame positions remained largely fixed. Consensus 
historians had argued the bomb was needed to end the war quickly to save lives that would have 
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been lost in a costly invasion of Japan. New Left revisionists had countered the bomb, maintaining 
that it was unnecessary because Japan was already defeated in practical terms and was only 
attempting to negotiate a surrender that would preserve the position of the emperor when the 
bombs were dropped.38  
Crane believed that scholarship on the atomic bomb was more controversial than any other 
topic of World War II history. A brief review of the writing of two principal adversaries 
demonstrate lines of argument between traditionalists in the consensus camp, who generally 
accepted the Truman Administration’s reasoning, and revisionist scholars who concluded the 
United States practiced nuclear diplomacy against its former ally at the end of World War II. The 
publication of Gar Alperovitz’s Atomic Diplomacy (1965), critical of the traditionalist view of 
American policy in the revisionist spirit of the 1960s, set off a firestorm of debate.39 In his 
argument, Alperovitz asserted that Truman and his key advisors knew of Japan’s desperation in 
1945 and of alternatives to the bomb to end the war in a relatively short period of time. In the first 
place, United States intelligence had broken Japanese military encryption and knew of back-
channel attempts to use the Russians to broker a deal and even of the emperor’s personal 
intervention to end the war three weeks before Hiroshima. Second, before demand for an 
unconditional surrender was reconfirmed by the Potsdam declaration, all inner members of the 
administration except Secretary of State James Byrnes believed the surrender terms needed to be 
modified, including Secretary of War Henry Stimson and Army Chief of Staff General George 
Marshall, who both believed the Japanese would surrender only with a guarantee of the 
preservation of the dynasty—just what the United States allowed for in the final peace terms after 
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the bombs were dropped on Japan. Third, by mid-1945 both President Franklin Roosevelt (before 
his death in April) and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill had been briefed by their military 
chiefs—General George Marshall and his counterpart, General Sir Hastings Ismay—that Japan 
would likely surrender when it knew of Russia’s entrance in the Pacific Theater scheduled for 
early August. Fourth, Truman’s private letters and diary entries confirm he knew that Japan was 
tottering, and U.S. military planning documents reveal that if both phases of the planned invasion 
of Japan had been necessary, the maximum number of casualties would not have exceeded 72,000.  
In summary, Alperovitz argued the United States was not justified in using atomic weapons 
against Japan. Truman possessed both the means and the ends to finish the war: by easing the 
terms of surrender, by allowing Japan time to absorb the shock of the Russian entry into the war, 
or better yet, by working together with the Soviet Union to convince Japan of the hopelessness of 
its situation against the overwhelming power of allied forces. As further evidence of the United 
States’ intent to end the war using the bomb, Alperovitz cited the notes and anecdotal comments 
by and about Byrnes, Stimson, and Truman, indicating they were holding the cards against the 
Russians because of the United States monopoly of atomic weaponry resulting from the recently 
successful Los Alamos test of July 16, 1945.40 Thus, Alperovitz’s thesis: the U.S. used the bomb 
principally as atomic diplomacy to strengthen its position in negotiations with the Soviet Union 
over post-war Europe and the Far East.  
From the 1960s, revisionists carried momentum in the atomic bomb debate. But in the 
1990s, the traditionalist historian Donald Kagan provided sharp counter arguments to 
Alperovitz’s position. Specifically, Crane noted the merit of Kagan’s response to revisionists’ 
moral objections to dropping the bomb by making a case for leaders who chose “the least bad 
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course” at the end of World War II.41 Kagan marked revisionism and the bomb debate as 
emerging early with Norman Cousins, P.M.S. Blackett, William Appleman Williams, and D. F. 
Fleming among those who principally blamed Truman for the start of the Cold War. Kagan 
argued that those early revisionists and their successors were mistaken because Japan remained a 
serious threat in August, 1945, not only to American service personnel, but in the mind-set of 
American leaders. Kagan allowed that early estimates of American casualties suffered in an 
invasion of the Japanese home islands may have been unrealistically high, but those numbers no 
doubt made an impression on Truman and Stimson that stuck. For example, casualty figures 
prepared by General Douglas MacArthur for Marshall in June, 1945, pegged invasion casualties 
at just over 100,000 in the first ninety days of operations, not including significant additional 
allied civilian casualties. Coded message intercepts revealed that Japanese military aviation still 
posed a significant threat with about 10,000 aircraft of which half were ready as kamikazes. 
Moreover, the memory of taking 35 percent casualties or 75,000 men in Okinawa was a recent 
operational fact. In the planned amphibious landing area on Kyushu, status of ground forces was 
trending against an invasion as well. American casualty estimates were based on an attacking 
force of 766,000 against 300,000 defenders, but by July 31 the number of Japanese troops in the 
invasion area had swelled to 680,000 raising non-fatal casualties needing treatment to almost 
400,000.  
Kagan pointed out that casualty figures were only uncertain projections. What was 
important for decision makers was not what the actual casualties would be but rather what they 
thought at the time regarding casualties. The American leadership had regularly expressed 
intense concern over casualties before and after the bomb became a certainty. Though some 
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Japanese civilian leaders had made attempts to find peace through the Soviets and other neutral 
channels, American military leaders believed militarists had control of the country and were 
preparing a fight to the bitter end. Unconditional surrender had been a policy under Roosevelt to 
rally the country, and Truman could not easily change it. Allowing the Japanese to retain their 
emperor and end the war on the basis of negotiation could have been seen both as a sign of 
weakness to the Japanese and reneging on pledges made to the Soviets at the Yalta Conference. 
Kagan determined that all of these measures taken together, including a demonstration 
blast of the atomic bomb and warning the Japanese of the imminent entry of the Soviets into the 
Pacific Theater of war, were no guarantee of Japanese surrender. Some in the Japanese military 
remained in denial of impending defeat even after the entry of the Soviets and the bombs were 
dropped. Minister of War General Anami, in a meeting of the war cabinet, insisted Hiroshima 
had not been struck by an atomic bomb. In the aftermath of the bombing, despite revised 
surrender terms proposed by the United States that created an opening for retention of the 
emperor, but continued to insist on the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces, a 
fanatical faction in the military attempted to stage a coup. Kagan insisted that the impact of 
atomic weapons in overcoming Japan’s aversion to surrender was critical. He quoted the emperor 
expressing his fears that the “enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb”42 and that 
further resistance could only result in the destruction of Japan and the end of civilization.43 
Finally, Kagan answered revisionist charges regarding the immorality of employing atomic 
weapons under any circumstances because of the damage inflicted. Kagan responded by 
questioning the difference between atomic weapons and wholesale firebombing of cities in order 
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and magnitude. As evidence, Kagan cited the mass B-29 incendiary bombing of Tokyo in March, 
1945, that killed as many people as the bombing of Hiroshima and left hundreds of thousands 
homeless. Kagan stressed that in total war no distinction can be fairly made between innocent 
losses of life, albeit in Dresden, Nanking, Pearl Harbor, or Hiroshima. He concluded that Japan 
would not have surrendered short of the United States using atomic weapons. Paradoxically, in 
Kagan’s view, the atomic bombs, by preventing the war from continuing with an invasion of 
Japan, actually saved countless American and Japanese lives. The Truman Administration made 
the best decision possible given its tragic choices.44  
 
An Emerging Middle Ground Position: Post-revisionism 
The atomic bomb historiography landscape has never been as clear-cut as Crane pointed 
out. Archetypes of schools, represented by Alperovitz’s revisionist and Kagan’s consensus 
positions, Barzun and Graff remind historians in their manual for researchers, are meant to 
satisfy a human need to order and find pattern.45 Accordingly, Samuel Walker pronounced that a 
Post-revisionism school on the atom bomb emerged by the early 1990s staking out a middle 
ground between the Consensus and New Left revisionist positions. These historians did not 
conceive of the ending of the world’s worst conflict as an either/or proposition between dropping 
the bomb to save lives or of using the bomb to intimidate the Russians. The Post-revisionists, to 
varying degrees, believed that evidence supported aspects of both positions.46  
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For example, Walker found Bernstein fitting in between the consensus and revisionist 
camps on the validity of casualty projections. He rejected revisionists’ low estimates by citing 
American military planners who considered a change in the landing site for the invasion because 
of the high build-up of Japanese forces in the Kyushu area. Likewise, Bernstein rejected 
Truman’s post-war claims of casualties in the hundreds of thousands trumpeted by traditionalists, 
because his review of 1945 archival studies could not support the president’s high projected 
losses. On the issue of nuclear diplomacy, Thomas Zeiler found a middle ground position by 
agreeing with revisionists that the bomb’s effect on the Soviets was a consideration, but he also 
determined that Truman was more concerned about ending the war as soon as possible than 
about impressing the Russians.47 Walker provided further confirmation of the shift in atom bomb 
historiography with his review of American college textbooks (1995). The survey revealed that 
beginning in the 1980s, post-revisionism—holding both the United States and the Soviet Union 
responsible in varying degrees for the Cold War—had become “a widely accepted framework in 
which a variety of other issues were debated.”48 
 
Truman: Decision-making and Atomic Bomb Momentum  
Closely related in the 1990s to developing trends in atom bomb historiography came a 
wave of historians’ concomitant study of Harry S. Truman, the American president who 
suddenly found himself, upon the death of Franklin Roosevelt, at the center of the atom bomb 
decision. David McCullough and numerous other biographers have recounted the familiar story 
of Truman as vice-president as being unaware of the top-secret Manhattan Project, “the largest 
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scientific-industrial undertaking in history.”49 In 1942, recognizing that Nazi Germany was 
likely engaged in attempting to produce a nuclear weapon, the United States government ramped 
up a crash program costing two billion dollars under the control of the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers that involved 200,000 people.50 At the very same time Truman met with Churchill and 
Stalin at Potsdam in July, 1945, to discuss the future of post-war Europe and the strategy to 
finish defeating Japan, the atomic bomb was successfully tested in New Mexico.51 
President Truman’s role in the decision to drop the atomic bomb on Hiroshima continues 
to be a matter of concern for historians. Time twice chose Truman as its “Man of the Year.” The 
magazine, in selecting Truman in December, 1945, stated:  
It was no scientist who, by historic accident, somewhat unwittingly, somewhat against his 
own will, became more than any other man responsible for the bomb, its use in 1945 and 
its future. It was an ordinary, uncurious man without any pretensions to scientific 
knowledge, without many pretensions of any kind, a man of average size and weight, 
wearing bifocal glasses, fond of plain food, whiskey-&-water and lodge meetings. It was 
Harry Truman, 32nd President of the U.S.52  
In succeeding decades, interest in Truman’s role in employing the atomic bombs dropped 
on Japan has not waned and remains controversial. Joseph Ellis’s, American Creation (2008), 
traced critical moments in the founding of the United States. He termed the Truman decision 
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along with Jefferson’s acquisition of the Louisiana Purchase the two most important instances of 
executive action in American history.53 In 2009, The Christian Science Monitor reported initial 
steps by the city government of Potsdam, Germany to memorialize a small plot of ground as 
Hiroshimaplatz (Hiroshima place) opposite the villa used as headquarters by the American 
delegation to the Potsdam Conference. Truman, while in residence at “the little White House,” 
on hearing of the successful atomic test in New Mexico, created the order that set in motion steps 
that resulted in the atomic bombing of Hiroshima. United States expatriate critics opposed the 
memorial arguing the designation ignored historical context: by the summer of 1945, the Allies 
were determined to use extraordinary means to end the ongoing suffering caused by the Japanese 
refusing to surrender. As backdrop, the Monitor noted Truman’s rise in public estimation since 
the 1990s following the success of McCullough’s biography, Truman (1992). The reporting 
quoted historian David Brinkley’s opposing viewpoint as well, stating McCullough’s biography 
largely overlooked arguments against Truman’s decision approving the use of the atomic 
bomb.54 
In 1996, the Organization of American Historians conducted a Truman forum at its 
annual meeting. A spate of Truman biographies had generated widespread public attention, 
including ongoing interest in Truman’s role overseeing use of the bomb. A panel of historians 
first critiqued David McCullough’s Truman (1992), Robert Ferrell’s Harry S. Truman: A Life 
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(1996), and Alonzo Hamby’s Man of the People: A Life of Harry S. Truman (1995) and then 
Ferrell and Hamby, both in attendance, responded to the panel in turn.  
The panel and the biographers expressed a range of opinions on Truman’s role in the 
atomic bomb decision. William Chafe and Joan Hoff asserted with Hamby, strongly concurring 
that Truman’s approval at Potsdam authorizing a directive that an atomic weapon be used after 
August 3, 1945, was a non-decision. Because of ongoing momentum among decision-makers, 
effective alternatives to using the bomb were never raised with Truman. By degree, Chafe, Hoff, 
and Franklin Mitchell objected that the biographers did not seriously consider the atomic bomb 
revisionist positions centered on the proposition that the United States employed its monopoly of 
the atomic bomb as leverage against the Soviet Union’s objectives in Europe and East Asia. 
Mitchell supported Hoff’s position that all the biographies had endorsed the orthodox view that 
Truman’s decision was driven by a desire to save lives and end the war as soon as possible and 
further, that future biographies should consider revisionist positions in assessing Truman’s 
decision. In Randall Wood’s analysis, Ferrell’s biography presented Truman developmentally, 
whose life experiences were a progression building toward the presidency. Wood’s differed with 
Chafe, Hoff, and Mitchell by pointing out that Ferrell’s book had engaged the revisionist 
positions by posing arguments countering the nuclear diplomacy position. Wood viewed Ferrell 
portraying Truman as disturbed by memories of Hiroshima and as acting practically in 
responding to Cold War threats. Hoff especially was critical of all three biographies insisting that 
unlike the popular image portraying Truman as the ordinary man possessed with good sense 
rising to meet serious challenges with great decisions, Truman was rash and not thoughtful. On 
the contrary, his actions were reckless using the bomb and setting off the Cold War. Ferrell 
countered Hoff and Chafe by arguing that Truman was both level-headed and deliberate in 
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making decisions. Mitchell had described Hamby’s biography during the forum as embracing 
“modern psychology to produce the most thorough analytical and interpretive account of 
Truman.”55 Mitchell distilled in Hamby’s psychological profiling of Truman an upbringing 
engendering a drive for success tempered by insecurity over identity. In his response to panel 
members, Hamby emphasized that despite different objectives in the biographies, he, 
McCullough, and Ferrell were in close agreement in assessing Truman. Hamby, in summation, 
stressed that the main division of historians in evaluating the Truman presidency remained the 
atomic bomb, which he argued was the most important event in human history in consideration 
of the nuclear age it created.56  
Coming in the wake of high visibility biographies and the 1995 Enola Gay exhibition 
controversy, the historians’ forum on Truman was an important part of an ongoing review of the 
Truman presidency in social science publications. These allied studies’ timing shared in riding a 
wave of public interest caught up in understanding Truman’s personality. Ferrell, from his 
survey of several mostly favorable Truman biographies, cited polling data from the Truman 
Library, which reported Truman’s public image had been rehabilitated from a base standing in 
1951 below Nixon’s facing impeachment to leading all post-war presidents by the Reagan 
years.57  
Prior to the 1996 historians’ forum, as the generally positive public consciousness 
common man view of Truman was ascendant, Hamby’s personality study profiled Truman 
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struggling through life adjusting to societal norms because of a compromised developmental 
background caused by his relationships with his father and mother, challenges to his gender 
identity, and relations with the opposite sex.58 Despite Hamby’s disclosure of Truman’s 
developmental challenges, Robert Robins and Robert Dorn’s analytical matrix of stress and 
political leadership identified Truman positively, as a “Well-tempered warrior.”59 The 
researchers’ definition of a well-tempered warrior was one whose well-integrated personality 
provided the ability to cope with stressors despite discomfort. The researchers cited the “most 
remarkable example” as Truman’s stated ability to sleep soundly after his decision to use the 
atomic bomb on Hiroshima and secondly, months later to dismiss Robert Oppenheimer, the lead 
scientist of the Manhattan Project, as a “crybaby” because of his objections to Truman’s attitude 
regarding the use of nuclear weapons.60  
Cultural historians strive to understand a period or a people through analyzing the 
language and behavior found in documentary sources as well as art and literature.61 As some 
historians probed Truman’s psyche to gain insights into his decision-making, others began to 
focus on the influence of race as an under-weighted factor driving an extreme war making 
aggression between Japan and the United States. Paul Boyer’s book, By the Bomb’s Early Light 
(1985), broadly reviewed American culture in the aftermath of Hiroshima. His treatment of 
racism as a factor to employ the atomic bomb against Japan distinctively pointed out differences 
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in the reactions of Black and white Americans to the decision. In surveys, higher percentages of 
Black Americans opposed using the atomic bomb. Black media and intellectuals questioned the 
willingness to use the bomb on Japan, a colored race, and not on Germany, a white race.62  
In his body of work, John Dower recovered an impressive cultural record of the Japanese 
and American peoples’ intersecting interests dating from the West’s earliest contacts with Japan 
to the postwar period. In the 1980s, Dower became distracted from writing a book on postwar 
Japan to write War without Mercy (1986). Dower disclosed that what diverted his attention was 
his realization that the occupation of Japan and its rapprochement with the United States could 
not be understood without investigating the animosity between them when at war. Discerning 
racial hatred impelled Dower to research non-traditionally. He studied cultural artifacts as a key 
to comprehending American and Japanese attitudes toward each other. Dower determined 
contempt and hatred in contemporary media, such as songs, movies, and cartoons along with 
popular and academic writing were used to dehumanize the enemy and unleash horrific levels of 
violence on both sides.63 
Dower began by thoroughly documenting how self-serving stereotypes of the “Self” and 
“Other” stretched back centuries. Westerners saw in the Japanese a “Yellow Peril” and the 
Japanese revered in their purity, the Yamato, a master race. Hatred escalated in combat often 
with no quarter given, culminating in the last “killing year” when the United States military 
suffered over half its Pacific War casualties and hundreds of thousands of Japanese civilians died 
                                               
62 Paul Boyer, By the Bomb’s Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of 
the Atomic Age (New York: Random House, 1985), 183, 198-199.  
63 John W. Dower, War Without Mercy: Race & Power in the Pacific War. (New York: 
Random House, 1986): ix-x. 
79 
in air raids.64 Dower’s book provided clear evidence of extreme malice even to the war’s end. In 
the conflict’s last days, the Japanese brutally executed captured airmen and the Americans 
launched a final 1,000 plane raid of B-29 bombers accompanied by fighter escorts on Tokyo with 
peace being declared before all aircraft returned to base.65 
What Dower has termed a race war for millions and a critical aspect of World War II has 
found congruence in works by Alan Smith and Ronald Takaki.66 Smith reported ethnocentrism 
as persistent in Japan. The term, nihonjinron, applied to a vast literature of history and culture, 
conveys the belief that compared to the West, Japanese ways are superior. Takaki, a sociologist, 
argued bigotry has remained endemic in American culture. Racial hostility influenced first 
contact with the Powhatans in Virginia Colony through to Truman’s decision to use the atomic 
bomb.67  
 
World War II Desensitization: The Air War 
Powerful impetuses of Truman, race, and geo-political imperatives merged in an air 
campaign ending in conflagration over Japan in August, 1945. Recent monographs on the World 
War II air war have addressed the motives and objectives of principal adversaries and provided 
significant historical insight into Truman’s actions related to Hiroshima. On the cusp of World 
War II, advocates of air power recognized the potential for enemy aircraft to penetrate far 
beyond national borders and rain poison gas and explosive ordinance on enemy centers inflicting 
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wholesale death and destruction on civilian populations. As a consequence, countries at war, 
including Germany, Britain and France, realizing a shared vulnerability, at first pronounced and 
held to a “no first-use policy.”68 By 1932, successive international conferences at The Hague had 
proposed the proscription of deliberately targeting civilian populations and private property by 
aerial bombardment.69 President Roosevelt formally admonished belligerent nations in 
September, 1939, that “under no circumstances undertake the bombardment from the air of 
civilian populations or of unfortified cities.”70 
The resolve to not target civilians progressively gave way to perceived military 
exigencies. Allied aerial bombing in Europe influenced the strategic bombing of Japan. Across 
Europe, allied and non-belligerent countries reeled from the German blitzkrieg. In facing the 
threat of invasion after Dunkirk, the only way Britain could strike back was its Bomber 
Command. But initially, its fleet of lumbering, outgunned, outdated aircraft was no match for 
modern German fighters and surface defenses. Sorties attacking German high value war-making 
targets sometimes suffered unsustainable aircraft/crew losses of 50 percent or more. 
Consequently, more and more, the British turned to less accurate night bombing missions 
causing ever-increasing collateral civilian suffering. After centers in Rotterdam and London were 
hit when German bombing attacks went awry, Britain and Germany each deliberately targeted 
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civilian populations in cities. In 1942, with increasing numbers of Halifaxes and heavy 
Lancasters, Britain had begun to abandon bombing tactical military targets in favor of what was 
termed area bombing. On these missions, massed numbers of bombers dropped tons of 
incendiaries and high explosives on German cities with the express purpose of destroying the 
morale of civilian populations, especially industrial workers. Germany never developed a heavy 
bomber and instead used its air force through the remaining course of the war largely in support 
of its ground forces and defending against allied bombing missions.71 What resulted was the 
wholesale destruction of German cities, a harbinger of what awaited Japan. 
At the Casablanca Conference of January, 1943, Churchill and Roosevelt had agreed to 
make non-stop bombing of Germany a priority as part of an overall strategy to advance fronts 
first in Sicily then in France.72 Bomber Command and the United States Army Air Forces 
together created a combined bomber offensive reaching deeper and deeper into the German 
Reich. While the British area bombed at night, the Americans persisted with a doctrine of 
precision day bombing trusting in advanced targeting technology to hit targets directly related to 
the German war effort. B-17 Flying Fortresses became operational in increasingly large numbers 
in 1943. Despite a defensive tactic of stacking aircraft in flight formations that provided 
overlapping fields of defensive firepower, losses mainly to German fighters were often crippling 
until long range allied fighter escorts secured aerial dominance in 1944. During that time frame, 
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the United States Army Air Force continued precision attacks, increasingly conducting round-
the-clock raids with Bomber Command, aspects of which targeted civilians.73 
Confident in their purpose, the American generals had resisted pressure from Bomber 
Command to area bomb cities: out of ethos, a security in arms, and fear of creating a bad public 
image back home that would derail their aspirations for the USAAF to become a separate service 
branch.74 Yet, the USAAF often participated in joint operations assuming responsibility for war-
related targets while Bomber Command struck civilian areas. These mass attacks could result in 
catastrophic destruction. In part, because of the Russian delegation’s direct appeal to allies at 
Yalta to disrupt German transportation hubs to and from the Eastern Front, American bombers 
engaged in attacks culminating in the firebombing of Berlin and Dresden in February, 1945. An 
estimated 20,000-30,000 people were incinerated in the Dresden raids that burned out the center 
of the medieval architectural jewel. The muted protests that ensued in Britain and the United 
States in defense of civilians were the last of World War II.75 
In the air war against Germany, the reality between area and precision bombing was often 
a matter of intentions, not results. Efforts at precision bombing, often highly inaccurate, 
degraded even more in poor weather conditions or through clouds (“blind bombing” guided by 
radar) and under flak and fighter attack.76 High value war making targets such as bases, factories, 
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transportation hubs, and communication nodes were often co-located in areas where civilians 
lived and worked resulting in tens of thousands of civilian casualties.77 
American commitment gradually shifted from precision bombing over the course of the 
war in Europe. Blind bombing represented 80 percent of bombing in the last months of the war. 
From February, 1945, the Royal Air Force area bombed numerous small undamaged cities at low 
altitude with the objective of demoralizing the population with historians differing over the 
degree of USAAF participation. In Germany, in total, estimates as high as 600,000 people were 
killed and 131 towns and cities were bombed as a consequence of allied strategic bombing.78 
Marilyn Young has written that “to the policymakers, air war is abstract,” amounting to a 
remote exchange of sending messages and receiving reports.79 Young and other historians have 
reported how air crews in World War II reported a similar psychological disconnect from those 
experiencing being bombed thousands of feet below. Under orders, airmen were buoyed by the 
belief they were fighting a just war with the solid support of their people. Given the scale of 
carnage, to Americans at home and military personnel in the fight, wholesale aerial destruction 
could seem just retribution for horrific Axis atrocities that killed millions.80 
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Area bombing, evolving into practiced norm in Europe, became operational fact in the 
Pacific Theater of WWII.81 USAAF Generals Arnold and LeMay promoted strategic bombing 
against civilians as the quickest means necessary to break the morale of the Japanese, save 
American lives, and end the war.82 The bombing campaign against the Japanese home islands 
began in late 1944 when the Marianas were taken and provided bases for long range B-29 
Superfortresses. Initial daytime attacks from high altitudes to avoid fighter resistance were 
ineffective. Starting in March 1945, mass numbers of bombers flying at low altitude began 
nighttime incendiary attacks burning down much of Tokyo, Nagoya, Osaka, and Kobe causing 
catastrophic human and material losses. The estimated 85,000 initially killed in the Tokyo 
firestorm was believed to be greater than the immediate deaths from the atomic blasts on either 
Hiroshima or Nagasaki. LeMay’s extension of the area bombing campaign over Japan in the 
following months resulted in hundreds of thousands more casualties and the destruction of 
almost half the land in sixty-six principal cities.83 
This was the conflict Truman inherited on becoming president on April 12, 1945, less 
than a month before the war formally ended in Europe. Two days into his presidency, in 
addressing Congress, Truman pledged to the nation to continue Roosevelt’s policies of forcefully 
finishing the war and demanding unconditional surrender from the Axis. Aida Donald found 
Truman, during the period of transition, capable of quickly getting up to speed on diplomatic and 
military matters, deliberate in relying on Roosevelt’s expert advisors, and decisive in the blur of 
momentous events demanding presidential action. Donald acknowledged the influence of Robert 
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Donovan’s Conflict & Crisis (1977), along with the biographical works of the historians featured 
in the Organization of American Historians forum (1996) and discussed in this paper, in her 
positive accounting of Truman in Citizen Soldier (2012). Donald, though, believed her book 
provided a more psychological rendering of Truman’s personality in facing the issues of his 
presidency.84 
In fact, Donovan’s biography found key advisors appreciative of Truman’s ability to 
quickly reach decisions. But his study also agreed with foreign policy historian Herbert Feis’s 
assessment that Truman’s hastiness in his early years in dealing with pressing issues masked a 
persistent insecurity (recalling Hoff’s severe indictment of Truman at the Organization of 
American Historians forum (1996) for irresponsibly resorting to nuclear weapons). Donald, 
despite her overall positive assessment, noted Truman often betrayed uneasiness by comparing 
his actions with what Roosevelt would have done.85 
For decades historians have continued to advance now familiar reasons for why the 
United States dropped atomic bombs on Japan at the close of World War II such as ending the 
war quickly, saving lives, Japan’s refusal to surrender, nuclear diplomacy, revenge, racism, and 
Truman’s personality. Recently, Michael Gordin’s and Tsuyoshi Hasegawa’s influential studies, 
which focus on the final days leading to Japan’s surrender, have given powerful support to the 
diversity of the Post-revisionist historical position: The United States employed nuclear weapons 
against Japan for a number of reasons other than the traditionalist position that Consensus 
historians’ stress of ending the war quickly to save lives, or on the New Left revisionists’ 
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assertion that atomic bombs were dropped primarily for the purpose of atomic diplomacy, i.e., to 
discourage aggressive moves by the Soviet Union in Europe and the Far East.86  
Gordin, in Five Days in August (2007), like other historians focusing on the air campaign 
in the European and Pacific Theaters of World War II, argued the USAAF had progressively 
succumbed to the use of area bombing in Germany. Subsequently, waves of B-29 
Superfortresses indiscriminately hammered Japanese cities when the air campaign against Japan 
was ramped up in 1945.87 Strategic bombing, which included the targeting of civilians, had 
become an even higher priority against Japan for a number of reasons. First, American ground 
troops island-hopping across the Pacific could not yet bring the fight directly to Japan. Second, 
because the effectiveness of the air campaign against Germany was controversial, the USAAF 
felt they had something to prove. And last, the American military had experienced moral 
slippage over the course of the war claiming the most victims in world history.88 The British and 
American’s air campaign in Europe had become inured to violence. Hasegawa joined Gordin in 
dismissing a proscription on using atomic weapons against Japan because non-combatants would 
bear collateral destruction. The moral divide had already been passed when incendiaries were 
used on cities without regard to distinguishing between civilians and military.89 
Gordin stressed that after the successful test of the bomb in New Mexico, United States 
policymakers were not of one mind that acquiring the atomic bomb meant an immediate end to 
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the war. Even though Truman became enthralled by the potential of the bomb, his administration 
in official communications tried to create a mystique about the power of the bomb to hasten 
Japan’s surrender. Meanwhile, the military chain of command churned to carry out operational 
expectations. In accord with American and British military leadership, service branches, charged 
with transporting nuclear weapons to the Pacific Theater and employing them against the 
Japanese homeland, continued to operate on the assumption the atomic bomb was just another 
weapon albeit of vastly greater magnitude. Despite the understanding by the warring parties that 
Japan had lost the war, the American government believed several bombs and an invasion of the 
home islands would be needed for Japan to surrender. In summary, Truman and his advisors 
never believed nuclear weapons to be the geopolitical game-changer of a higher order during the 
war that it became after the war.90 
Hasegawa advanced a range of familiar reasons for the American government’s use of 
nuclear weapons at the end of World War II: revenge for Pearl Harbor and the barbaric treatment 
of American POWs; to save lives by avoiding an invasion of Japan; and to impose an 
unconditional surrender on Japan.91 But what was noteworthy about Hasegawa’s analysis of 
events leading to Japan’s surrender and a major theme of his book Racing the Enemy (2005) was 
his accounting of the intense American-Soviet competition over the postwar Far East to gain 
geo-political advantage.92 With the United States facing the prospect of heavy losses in an 
invasion of the Japanese homeland, the Americans sought Soviet help in engaging Japanese 
forces in Manchuria and China. At the Yalta Conference, Stalin promised to enter the conflict in 
East Asia within three months of the war ending in Europe. The Americans pledged the Soviets 
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would get all of Sakhalin, the Kuril Islands and economic rights in China.93 Already, in the 
closing months of the war in Europe, the Allies sparred over agreements reached at Yalta on 
prospective Axis reparations and free elections in Eastern Europe.94 Given a rising distrust 
between Truman and Stalin, and the successful nuclear detonation in New Mexico on July 16, 
1945, the Americans now considered Soviet intervention in the Far East a liability rather than an 
asset. Hasegawa concluded that for Truman the atomic bomb represented the potential to strike a 
mortal blow at Japan and thereby prevent the Soviet Union from establishing postwar hegemony 
in East Asia by force of arms as it was presently doing in Eastern Europe.95 
The reality of the successful atomic bomb test, occurring during the Potsdam Conference, 
made apparent the adversarial national interests of the Allies. The Potsdam Declaration, meant to 
pressure Japan to surrender without an invasion, was deliberately issued by the United States, 
Britain, and China without the inclusion of the Soviet Union. In turn, Stalin advanced the order 
for the Red Army, massing along the Chinese frontier, to attack Japanese forces before the 
Americans could use the bomb to end the war. In Hasegawa’s words, both sides were racing the 
enemy to end the Pacific War “on their own terms.”96 Practically, in the following weeks, the 
United States and the Soviet Union countered each other to project geopolitical influence over 
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Northeast Asia and Japan. As a result, before Japan accepted the surrender terms spelled out in 
the Potsdam Declaration, the United States dropped atomic bombs on Japan in the midst of its 
ongoing air campaign. The Soviet military took possession of Manchuria, the northern Korean 
peninsula, southern Sakhalin, and the Kuril Island chain, while American occupation forces 
established firm control of the Japanese main islands.97 
In addition to operational exigencies and power politics, Hasegawa like Dower, identified 
racial animus driving desensitization directed at the enemy nation. Hasegawa found Truman’s 
rationale after dropping the second bomb on Nagasaki telling: 
Having found the bomb we have used it. We have used it against those who attacked us 
without warning at Pearl Harbor, against those who have starved, and beaten and 
executed American prisoners of war, and against those who have abandoned all pretense 
of obeying international law of warfare.98 
Truman, Hasegawa concluded, in bombing Hiroshima and Nagasaki was clearly 
motivated by revenge and believed the Japanese had violated international laws of war. In 
Truman’s thinking, no inconsistency existed between his condemnation of Japanese barbarity 
and burning down their cities. Yet, only a day later, Truman expressed second thoughts in a 
written statement to Senator Richard Russell that were confirmed in Henry Wallace’s reflections 
as Commerce Secretary during a cabinet meeting. The president, in plaintive language, had put a 
hold on more atomic attacks because he could not bear the idea of wiping out another 100,000 
women and children. Incoming information was making clearer the extent of the damage to 
Hiroshima. With increasing reflection, Truman had realized conventional and atomic weapons 
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were different.99 For history, Hasegawa apprehended a turning point: “The dawn of the nuclear 
age began at that moment.”100 
Donald, in assessing the decision to use the atomic bomb, differed with Hasegawa and 
Gordin over Truman’s motives. In her judgment, because Truman did not know in practical 
terms the destructive power of the atomic bomb, his direct responsibility was mitigated. Those 
who bore the most responsibility for its use were the scientists and policymakers who had 
developed the weapon and directed how it was to be used. In fact, based on what the president 
could understand about the true power of the bomb, he and Secretary of War Henry Stimson had 
issued a directive that civilians should not be targeted. Donald charged that the secret advisory 
committees with responsibility for considering the potential use of the bomb against Japan had 
deviated from their responsibility by locating civilian areas in drop zones and placing military 
targets on peripheries. These were the Scientific and Interim Committees of leading government, 
scientific, and industrial leaders who made their recommendations to the president to use nuclear 
weapons against Japan in June of 1945.101  
When Truman became president, Stimson’s influence gave way to James Byrnes, a key 
Roosevelt advisor who headed the Office of War Mobilization after representing South Carolina 
in the House and the Senate and serving as a Supreme Court justice. Truman appointed Byrnes 
Secretary of State in July, 1945, where he helped shape a hard-line position within the 
administration favoring the use of the atomic bomb against Japan. In response, resistance to 
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growing bomb momentum arose from some scientists working on the Manhattan Project and key 
policymakers who had become familiar with the potential destructive capability of nuclear 
weapons. Niels Bohr, Leo Szilard, and Felix Frankfurter, notable among dissenters who argued 
for sharing atom bomb control with the Soviets to avoid a future arms race and for forcing 
Japan’s surrender without the atom bomb, were denied direct access to Truman.102 Yet, other 
historians have clearly revealed Truman did develop a not insignificant impression of the 
destructive potential of the weapon prior to Hiroshima. Stimson led a thorough briefing on the 
bomb for Truman when he became president.103  
 
Atom Bomb Historiography: Current State and Future Prospects 
Historian Richard Rhodes, author of The Making of the Atomic Bomb (1987), in a sixty 
year retrospective article for National Geographic in 2005, warned of the overhanging nuclear 
threat of August, 1945. Rhodes wrote that eight countries possessed nuclear weapons and twenty 
or so others had the know-how and materials to go nuclear. Meanwhile, scientists possessed the 
expertise to pass on nuclear secrets to rogue states, while terrorists and criminal networks could 
seek fissile materials to create dirty bombs or gain possession of nuclear weapons from nations 
whose nuclear arsenals were not secure.104  
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Atom bomb momentum leading to the destruction of Hiroshima, likely because of its 
ever-present influence on humanity, remains a linchpin pondered and ordered by contending 
schools of historiography. Gordin has stressed that “the history as usually presented focuses on 
both what Truman intended to accomplish by authorizing the atomic bombings and what role 
those bombings played in ending the war.”105 As this paper reported, Samuel J. Walker, in a 
widely discussed 2005 essay, “The Decision to Use the Bomb: A Historiographical Update,” 
announced the emergence of a middle ground between Consensus and New Left revisionist 
positions. The core principles of this post- revisionist school borrowed elements from both the 
Consensus and New Left revisionist schools of historiography—atomic bombs were dropped on 
Japan to save lives and to use the bomb to intimidate the Russians. 
Today, atom bomb historiography has sustained an interest among a new generation of 
historians. Alex Wellerstein, an historian of science at the American Institute of Physics, in a 
2013 blog post, “synthesized” National Regulatory Commission retired historian Samuel 
Walker’s comprehensive address at an Atomic Heritage Foundation sponsored workshop. 
Walker’s lecture, as related in Wellerstein’s post, retrospectively reviewed the principal positions 
of atom bomb historiography considered in this paper.  
Walker first summarized the traditionalist (consensus) position that dominated historical 
interpretation from the end of World War II to the 1960s. Truman made the decision to use 
atomic weapons to end World War II quickly and save lives. Despite being defeated militarily, 
Japan would not surrender. The emperor admitted in the Imperial Rescript addressing his people 
that dropping the bomb compelled Japan to surrender.  
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Walker next assessed the basis of the New Left revisionist position which materialized 
out of the tumult of the 1960s, growing in acceptance until the early 1990s. The Truman 
administration understood that Japan was already defeated militarily when the bomb was 
dropped. The United States knew from intelligence gathering that Japan had been secretly 
approaching third party countries to broker surrender. Thus, the “real” reason the United States 
used atomic weapons was atomic diplomacy—a show of force to exact concessions from the 
Soviet Union after the war. The Japanese leadership cited the power of the bomb as necessitating 
surrender only to save face. In fact, the most important reason Japan surrendered was because of 
the Soviet Union’s sudden attack on Japanese forces in Manchuria with the threat the Soviet 
victory there posed to the Japanese homeland.  
Walker explained the emerging consensus (the post-revisionist middle position) as 
identifying Truman as not reflecting much on the consequences of using atomic weapons or 
invading Japan. Rather, the president was being swept up by events in directing policy so 
potential Japanese casualties were not seriously considered. The United States found itself at war 
possessing atomic weapons that would be used. Japan could not win the war, but refused to 
surrender. The country’s leadership attempted to secure the one condition most important in the 
mind-set of the Japanese—the retention of the Emperor as divine, thereby preserving the national 
polity, an outcome wholly unacceptable to the Americans.  
Wellerstein’s blog synthesized Walker’s analysis of the Post-revisionist position by 
relating “there were multiple motivations for dropping the bomb.” The main reason for using 
atomic weapons was to advance the war effort, but the United States fully intended to exploit its 
atomic advantage to shape world events to its benefit especially in dealing with the Soviet Union. 
Japanese militarists were bent on forcing a costly invasion of the home islands on the United 
94 
States to gain a negotiated settlement. In summary, a combination of the twin shocks of atomic 
weapons employed against Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the Soviet invasion of Manchuria 
caused Japan’s hard-liners to accept Emperor Hirohito’s decision to capitulate to terms dictated 
by the United States.  
Wellerstein concluded his blog with Walker’s summary of the present state of atom bomb 
historiography. Because of growing acceptance of the middle ground position, debate had waned 
on contentious, long-standing issues. For example, justifying the use of the bomb based on how 
many casualties would be suffered in an invasion wasn’t debated much anymore. But clearly, the 
interpretive divide over the decision to drop atomic weapons on Japan persists. According to 
Wellerstein, Walker’s concluding remarks asserting a “cooling in the tone of the debate” 
accompanying the ascendency of the Post-revisionist middle position immediately drew a 
vigorous response at the workshop by prominent revisionist historian Peter Kuznick, which 
indicated to Wellerstein’s thinking, the debate continues.106 
Walker may be right in his assessment of the ascendency of the Post-revisionist position 
among historians citing multiple reasons for the United States using atomic bombs against Japan, 
but Consensus and New Left revisionist positions have not disappeared. In fact, Kuznick’s recent 
collaboration with Oliver Stone, The Untold History of the United States (2012), confirmed the 
persistence of the New Left revisionist position: although Japan was militarily defeated by 
August, 1945, the United States dropped atomic bombs on Japan to intimidate the Soviet 
                                               
106 Alex Wellerstein, “The Decision to Use the Bomb: A Consensus View?” Restricted 
Data: The Nuclear Secrecy Blog, March 8, 2013, Accessed July 25, 2014, 
http://blog.nuclearsecrecy.com/2013/03/08/the-decision-to-use-the-bomb-a-consensus-view/. 
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Union.107 August, 2015, brought a shattering blast of international media commentary 
recognizing Hiroshima as ground zero of an imperiled world. From Singapore to Nairobi to 
Jerusalem to Teheran, writers and bloggers connected Iran to Japan and proliferation to 
disarmament. In The Washington Post, Richard Cohen’s editorial, “No Apologies Necessary,” 
could be read as a summation of Secretary Stimson’s February, 1947, foundational Consensus 
defense in Harper’s Magazine: using the atomic bomb was the least, worst choice that avoided 
invading Japan and saved countless lives.108 
Hiroshima for historians remains unsettled history. What generates such passion over 
events now seven decades removed? Gordin insightfully answered in Five Days in August 
(2007): it’s because the “world … is still living out the consequences of how World War II 
ended”—from mushroom clouds, to nuclear proliferation, to conventional weapons of mass 
destruction.109 As historians have recognized the iconic markers of Pearl Harbor and Hiroshima 
that grounded the World War II generation, so does humanity today in contemplating the power 
of the atom. 
  
                                               
107 Stone and Kuznick, The Untold History of the United States, (New York: Simon & 
Shuster, 2012): 145-147, 172, 178. 
108 Richard Cohen, The Washington Post, August 19, 2015, accessed October 18, 2015, 
https://ezproxy.lib.ndsu.nodak.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.lib.ndsu.nodak.
edu/docview/1704910153?accountid=6766; Samuel J. Walker, Prompt and Utter Destruction: 
Truman and the Use of the Atomic Bombs against Japan, 2nd ed. (Chapel Hill, SC: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 102; Gordin, Five Days in August, 142. 
109 Gordin, Five Days in August, 13. 
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III. THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE AND THE POLISH CRISIS OF  
1980-1981 
 
Thesis 
Although states of the Eastern Bloc and the world community were unaware of the Cold 
War policy shift, the top leadership of the Soviet Union, despite its posturing, abandoned the 
Brezhnev Doctrine at the time of the Polish Crisis of 1980-1981. Therefore, the imposition of 
martial law by the Polish People’s Republic was not needed to stave off an invasion of Poland by 
Warsaw Pact forces, but the action did succeed for a time in maintaining control of the country 
by the Polish Communist Party.  
 
Explanation of Thesis Statement 
The Brezhnev Doctrine was formulated and imposed by the Soviet Union in response to 
events in Czechoslovakia. Otto Ulc placed responsibility on the President of Czechoslovakia and 
First Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, Antonin Novotny, for creating conditions 
the Soviet Union deemed threatening to socialism. From the late 1950s, the hard-line 
Czechoslovak leader had dawdled on de-Stalinization amidst a country with economic woes and 
ethnic division. The country’s rudderless drift impelled a party takeover in January, 1968. 
Reformers, led by Alexander Dubcek, embarked on liberating policies dramatically expanding 
public polity. Alarmed by the weakening role of the party that could endanger Communist 
control and potentially destabilize neighboring bloc countries, under Moscow’s direction, 
Warsaw Pact forces intervened by imposing the Brezhnev Doctrine thus limiting the sovereignty 
of Czechoslovakia. Robin Alison Remington provided context by pointing out subsequent events 
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on the ground outraced formal policy; the invasion in August preceded General Secretary of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Leonid Brezhnev’s official pronouncement of the doctrine 
on November 13, 1968, which Remington summarized as the Soviet Union reserving the right to 
intervene directly or indirectly “if developments in any other socialist country threatened either 
(1) socialism within that country, or (2) the basic interests of other socialist countries.”1  
The Brezhnev Doctrine continued to be applied generally by analysts as an interpretive 
Cold War paradigm to explain Soviet response to nonconforming activity within satellite nations 
considered threatening to Moscow’s sphere of influence. Jiri Valenta, however, observed the 
Brezhnev Doctrine historically more properly represented a formalization; a continuation of 
established Soviet policy, reaching back to Khrushchev’s justification for the invasion of 
Hungary in 1956 and beyond to Stalin and Lenin. Since Hungary, he noted the Soviet Union had 
responded to revolutionary upheavals occurring in twelve-year intervals in Eastern Europe with 
Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Poland in 1980. The Soviet Union employed that course of action as 
well in 1979, intervening to maintain an allied government in Afghanistan.  
Andrzej Korbonski’s summary assessed the roots of the Polish Crisis of 1980-1981 as 
rejection of the imposition of foreign control stretching back centuries. Essentially, Poles 
regarded the Communist Polish Peoples Republic as illegitimate—an experiential consequence 
of their long history of domination by outsiders. Culturally, the Poles were prone to reject 
authority so, as a people, they overwhelmingly resisted the totalitarian control enforced from an 
eastern nemesis; Moscow. As a corollary, a marked distancing often persisted as well among 
Polish groups even after the World War II triumph and domination of the region by the Soviet 
                                               
1 Robin Alison Remington, “Yugoslavia,” in Communism in Eastern Europe, 2nd edition, 
edited by Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984): 247. 
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Union. Consequently, while workers, students, intelligentsia, and peasants seriously challenged 
the state’s choke hold on power in 1956, 1968, 1970, and 1976, the Poles’ own ongoing disunity, 
together with the government’s active measures sowed division which limited their gains.  
In June, 1976, the sociopolitical landscape changed significantly in Poland when strikes 
erupted over steep hikes in food prices. The government’s mass arrest of strikers moved 
intellectuals to support dissenters by creating a Worker’s Defense Committee (Komitet Obrony 
Robotnikow (KOR)). This alliance between workers and KOR, supported by the considerable 
influence of the Catholic Church, presented a potent challenge to the Polish Communist 
government by raising the level of domestic and international exposure, and by the broadening of 
demands to include human rights. Despite significant financial support from the Soviet Union at 
the time, Poland continued to stagger from consumer shortages, soaring inflation, and an 
untenable balance of payments. Moreover, the world economy in the late 1970s, under the 
burden of rising energy costs and a prolonged recession, provided no relief for the country’s 
outdated industrial and agricultural sectors by devaluing exports and driving up the cost of 
imports. The inability of the Edward Gierek government to deal with the economic crisis further 
alienated every important social group. Pressure on the government dramatically increased in 
June of 1979. The Polish Pope John Paul II’s homecoming energized massive crowds whose 
active presence simultaneously demonstrated their intense fervor for the nation and an abject 
disconnect from its master, the party.  
Ultimately, Korbonski concluded, despite three and a half decades of socialization 
campaigns, Communism could not penetrate Polish society to overcome what the people 
believed to be an illegitimate regime. In July, 1980, the government increased meat prices. 
Strikes rapidly swept the country exploding into mass opposition. By August, the government 
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found itself negotiating with a multi-factory strike committee leading hundreds of thousands of 
workers, which became the Solidarity movement. With an ominous shutdown of the country 
looming, the government was compelled to accept the strike committee’s twenty-one demands. 
The most significant provision recognized Solidarity as an independent trade union. The next 
year and a half was marked by impasse between a reconstituted government clinging to power 
and buying time, and Solidarity phenomenally swelling to ten million members and pushing the 
government for the realization of the agreement it had agreed to at Gdansk. The standoff ended 
after General Wojciech Jaruzelski consolidated military and civilian control over the Polish 
government in the fall of 1981. Following months of planning under extreme pressure from the 
Soviet Union, Jaruzelski imposed martial law internally using Polish security and armed forces 
in December, 1981.  
The crux of preparing a paper on the end of the Brezhnev Doctrine depends on a 
determination of when and under what circumstances the Brezhnev Doctrine was abandoned as a 
coercive mechanism to maintain socialist orthodoxy in the Eastern Bloc. Two Eastern European 
specialists, Vojtech Mastny and Matthew Ouimet, argue the Brezhnev Doctrine was jettisoned at 
the onset of the Polish Crisis of 1980-1981 when the Polish government faced a serious 
challenge to its governance by Solidarity and its allies. Both studies were grounded on archival 
information including statements of Soviet principals, particularly Mikhail Suslov and Yuri 
Andropov, in meetings of the Soviet Politburo, revealing that the Warsaw Pact would not 
intervene in Poland and would if necessary need to live with a Solidarity government. Terry 
Thompson’s research of Soviet party documents can be interpreted to support Mastny and 
Ouimet’s finding of a major Soviet foreign policy shift regarding the Eastern Bloc. Thompson 
cited official papers from the1976 World Communist Conference calling for “non-interference 
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and cooperation instead of promoting the leading role of the CPSU among socialist states.”2 He 
identified further confirmation of progression from Soviet central control in Brezhnev’s address 
to the Twenty-sixth Party Congress in 1981 where the General Secretary called for utilizing “the 
experience of fraternal countries”3 by not imposing “patterns that ignore the distinctions” of any 
country.4 Gale Stokes’s findings, as well, shored up an interpretive position that the Brezhnev 
Doctrine was inoperative and thus dead at the onset of the Polish Crisis. His comparison of 
Soviet actions in 1956 Hungary, 1968 Czechoslovakia, and 1981 Poland determined a continuum 
of decreasing military intervention on the part of the Soviet Union from primary invader, to 
coalition leader, to threatening bystander.  
Established historiography had maintained that the Brezhnev Doctrine remained intact 
through the duration of the Polish Crisis of 1980-1981 until Mikhail Gorbachev, in the last years 
of the Soviet Union as General Secretary of the Communist Party, initiated liberalizing domestic 
policies and engagement with the West to help end the Cold War. Indeed, in 1984, Vernon 
Aspaturian, Andrzej Korbonski, Jiri Valenta, and Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone’s findings, in a 
collaborative history, Eastern European Communism (1984), continued to support the traditional 
historiography. The authors’ varied perspectives, in their assessments of the state of the Cold 
War in the early 1980s, determined the Soviet Union retained hegemonic power over Poland. 
Aspaturian concluded the Soviet system depended on control of the East European states. 
Consequently, Soviet leaders would not likely allow Eastern Bloc states to break away. 
Korbonski, in his essay on Poland, stated the Polish government had demonstrated it was not, at 
                                               
2 Terry L. Thompson, Ideology and Policy: The Political Uses of Doctrine in the Soviet 
Union. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989): 146-147. 
3 Ibid., 147. 
4 Ibid. 
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the time, in immediate danger of collapse. Thus, the Soviet Union would not need to intervene. 
Valenta deemed the Polish Crisis to be a significant challenge to Soviet domination that could 
not be tolerated in light of the Brezhnev Doctrine. But, because of the questionable loyalty of 
some Polish military in the face of a Soviet invasion and the forces already committed to 
Afghanistan, Valenta wrote that the Soviet leadership had chosen a calculated strategy of using 
internal Polish armed forces to impose martial law. In Rakowska-Harmstone’s summary chapter 
of the collection, the author concluded the Soviet Union would never willingly give up 
domination of the Eastern Bloc. Attempts by satellite states such as Poland in 1980-1981 to 
realize national aspirations would continue to be put down by internal or external force as the 
Soviet Union continued its efforts to integrate the Eastern Bloc politically, culturally and 
economically into its international system. Significantly, Rakowska-Harmstone allowed, 
however, that with the imminent emergence in the early 1980s of a younger generation on the 
verge of taking the helm of the Soviet Union, a new policy more accommodating to Polish 
national aspirations was possible.  
Since the 1984 publication of Eastern European Communism, other prominent area 
specialists analyzing the challenge to Soviet power at the time of the Polish Crisis have offered 
insights that neither confirm the traditional view of Soviet policy imposing the Brezhnev 
Doctrine, nor embrace the more recent historiography of Mastny and Ouimet that the Brezhnev 
Doctrine in real terms expired when the Solidarity movement confronted the Polish People’s 
Republic in 1980-1981. Mark Kramer argued that it remains impossible to know with total 
certainty the Soviet leadership’s actions if the Polish government’s efforts to impose martial law 
had failed. But, based on the Soviet Union’s record in similar crises, the preponderance of 
evidence demonstrates the Warsaw Pact would have invaded, especially with regard to Poland, 
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where the Soviet bloc had even more to lose. Alternately, Timothy Garton Ash concluded that 
because the outcome of the Polish Crisis was uncertain, going forward the Soviet Union could 
not be sure of its actions. 
In the opinion of this writer, research to this point suggests the thesis positing that the 
practical termination of the Brezhnev Doctrine at the onset of the Polish Crisis may be tenable. 
Ouimet, in his book, The Rise and Fall of the Brezhnev Doctrine in Soviet Foreign Policy 
(2003), argued that recent evidence requires revision of standard historical interpretation: the 
Soviet Union in fact abandoned its prerogative of interference in socialist states before Soviet 
introspection after Brezhnev’s death in 1982 and Mikhail Gorbachev’s liberalization after 
assuming Soviet party leadership as General Secretary in 1985. Mastny’s work with archivists, 
military historians, and area specialists through the Parallel History Project on NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact based in Zurich, Switzerland has secured significant documentary evidence 
supporting the end of the Brezhnev Doctrine at the time of the 1980-1981 Polish Crisis rather 
than with the coming of Gorbachev’s “new thinking” easing Cold War hostility. Final realization 
of a research paper based on this working thesis would require in-depth examination of Mastny’s 
and Ouimet’s sources as well as a more comprehensive survey of the literature on the 
relationship of the Brezhnev Doctrine and the Polish Crisis of 1980-1981. 
 
Outline with Supporting Sources 
I. Poland’s position in the Warsaw Pact as a consequence of World War II 
A. Under pressure from the Soviet Union, Poland underwent a Communist 
takeover and its borders were moved substantially west. 
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B. Poland was considered a key to the Soviet Union’s security and control over 
Eastern Europe after World War II. 
1. Poland served as land buffer for the Soviet Union between its western 
frontier and hostile western European countries led by the United 
States. 
2. Vital transportation and communication links directly crossed Poland 
from the Soviet Union to its frontline ally, the German Democratic 
Republic.  
II. Poland’s severe economic and social dislocations in the 1970s 
A. Chronic mismanagement of the economy resulted in huge deficits covered by 
foreign loans and credits. 
B. Rising consumer expectations could not be satisfied by the command 
economy resulting in shortages and price hikes. 
 
De Weydenthal, Jan B. Poland: Communism Adrift. Beverly Hills, CA: The Center for Strategic 
and International Studies and Sage Publications, 1979.  
 
III. Developments in the position of the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries 
regarding labor and social unrest dating from the Prague Spring of 1968 to the late 
1970s  
A. The relaxation of Soviet control over the Eastern Bloc beginning with 
Khrushchev after 1956 ended with the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the 
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Warsaw Pact in August, 1968. Brezhnev Doctrine imposed on Eastern Bloc 
countries. 
1. Normalization imposed on bloc states through greater integration in 
the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance and the Warsaw Pact 
using Soviet economic and political models. 
2. Reliance on Soviet military for compliance in bloc countries 
discredited Communist legitimacy. 
B. Communism’s presumed consistency of interests among allies was abandoned 
by Soviets beginning in the mid-1970s. 
1. Soviets hiked oil prices to Council of Mutual Economic Assistance 
partners. 
2. Soviets agonized over intervention in Afghanistan. 
3. Soviets suffered sanctions, severe human and economic costs, and 
damage to reputation because of invasion of Afghanistan.  
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IV. By the late 1970s, components of an alternate civil society had coalesced in Poland 
galvanized by resistance to the Communist government 
A. Polish people harbored an historical hostility to Russia. 
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B. Resistance to the Communist government united from three important 
sources.  
1. Worker’s Defense Committee (KOR) led intellectual opposition. 
2. Resurgent Polish nationalism was inspired by Pope John Paul II. 
3. Growing organized labor movement resulted in widespread strikes.  
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V. Exploration of thesis: Soviet failure to impose the Brezhnev Doctrine in responding to 
labor and social unrest in Poland in 1980-1981 
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A. Probable factors influenced the Soviets not to impose the Brezhnev Doctrine. 
1. Sheer size and influence of Solidarity movement legalized as 
independent labor union August, 1980 deterred an invasion. 
2. The Soviet Union intervened and was tied down in war in Afghanistan 
from December, 1979. 
3. Soviets feared invasion of a Warsaw Pact country would further 
damage its international reputation (sting of boycott of 1980 Summer 
Olympics). 
4. Assuming responsibility for Poland’s already staggering economy 
compounded by invasion would further stress the Soviet Union’s 
weakened economy. 
5. Soviets wanted negotiations for arms reduction talks with the U.S. to 
proceed in light of record U.S. military spending. 
6. Soviets wanted the flow of technology from the West to continue. 
7. The Soviet Union experienced sustained pressure from western 
governments threatening consequences in the event of a Soviet 
invasion of Poland. 
8. Romania and Hungary presented internal resistance to invasion from 
within the Warsaw Pact. 
9. The Catholic Church headed by John Paul II exerted substantial 
influence on events in Poland outside government control. 
10. The Soviet general staff doubted the loyalty of Polish military units 
and anticipated active resistance in the event of a Soviet led invasion. 
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11. The Soviet Union preferred the internal imposition of martial law by 
the Polish Communist government and believed it could succeed.  
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B. Traditional and alternate historiography noted: operative disposition of the 
Brezhnev Doctrine remained intact or could not be known through the 
duration of the Polish Crisis of 1980-1981 based on study of recently 
uncovered archival sources collated with information derived from principal 
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historical actors. Supporting reasons for alternate historiography included the 
following: 
1. Consensus of top Soviet leadership remained determined throughout 
the Polish Crisis to suppress Solidarity.  
2. The Soviet Union remained committed to preserve vital Eastern Bloc 
transportation and communication links across Poland to the German 
Democratic Republic. 
3. Soviet armed forces personnel stationed in Poland needed protection. 
4. Soviet and Warsaw Pact authorities maintained close coordination 
with Polish counterparts on their martial law preparation and were 
prepared to invade if needed. 
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VI. Tentative conclusion: case may exist for historical revision determining the end of the 
Brezhnev Doctrine resulted as a consequence of the Polish Crisis of 1980-1981 
A. Evidence exists the Soviet Union may have abandoned the Brezhnev Doctrine 
with the onset of the Polish Crisis.  
1. Maneuvers and war games by Warsaw Pact forces in areas astride the 
Polish frontier, Baltic areas, and along the Baltic Coast in August, 
1980 and September, 1981 may have been deception to pressure 
Poland’s government to crackdown on the Solidarity movement. 
2. In November, 1980, Brezhnev conducted high level talks with Helmut 
Schmidt in Bonn stressing trade and security. 
3. While Solidarity planned a general strike, a national referendum on the 
Polish government, and free elections in December, 1981, General 
Jaruzelski continued to equivocate and in response the Soviet 
Politburo meeting on the Polish challenge to Communist rule, as in 
prior June, refused to act. 
4. General Jaruzelski’s imposition of martial law in Poland on December 
13, 1981 may have concealed Soviet lack of resolve in support of 
socialist internationalism for years to come, i.e., the death of the 
Brezhnev Doctrine.  
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B. Possible implications of historical revision of the end of the Brezhnev 
Doctrine 
1. Recent studies suggest established historiography is invalid that the 
Brezhnev Doctrine was progressively abandoned after Brezhnev’s 
death in 1982, resulting from Gorbachev’s domestic reforms and 
engagement with the West.  
2. Rather, the death of the Brezhnev Doctrine and the related collapse of 
Communism that occurred throughout Eastern Europe during 1989-
1991 began before the passing of Brezhnev’s generation of Soviet 
leadership. 
3. In Poland, specific factors challenging Communist control potentially 
applied across the Eastern Bloc as well. 
a. Competing factions weakened the Polish United Worker’s 
Party. 
b. The Communist party suffered mass defections to Solidarity. 
c. The Catholic Church represented an alternate authority to the 
state. 
d.  A large percentage of the Polish military was considered 
unreliable. 
e. Poland experienced a protracted economic crisis of spiraling 
prices marked by shortages of foodstuffs and consumer goods.  
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f. Civil society contained a high percentage of citizens from 
important groups disaffected by the Communist system 
including workers, farmers, students, and intellectuals. 
4. These conclusions of recent research of Soviet leadership point to 
further study with an implication outstanding that the Soviet position, 
vis-a-vis the West, was much weaker through the 1970s up to the onset 
of the Polish Crisis of 1980-1981 than previously known. 
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of 1980-1981 by pressuring Jaruzelski to impose martial law and suppress Solidarity’s threat to 
the Communist Party’s control of Poland, thereby avoiding a Warsaw Pact invasion and 
employment of the Brezhnev Doctrine. Yet, the author treated later occasions during the Reagan 
presidency when the Brezhnev Doctrine was invoked or was referenced as the United States 
understanding the doctrine as operative Soviet foreign policy. Matlock reported Gorbachev’s 
1988 speech to the United Nations as finally ending the Soviet Union’s adherence to the 
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Committee (KOR) in 1976 for the purpose of providing financial, legal, and medical support to 
those suffering dislocation from work or imprisonment for opposing the Polish government. His 
ideas of non-violent resistance compiled in this collection of essays, some written in prison, 
coincided with Walesa’s and served as a roadmap for Solidarity. As pointed out by Milosz and 
Schell respectively in the forward and introduction, Michnik’s manifold contributions to the 
movement included encouraging close collaboration of workers, intellectuals, and the church. He 
also urged an activism that empowered citizens by creating a civil society complementary to the 
administrative state which could eventually lead to power sharing. As primary source documents, 
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Ouimet’s book traced the loss of communist control in the Eastern Bloc from the 
upheavals of 1968 to the dissolution of the Soviet empire in 1989. In his chapter “Military 
Assistance to Poland in 1980?,” the author argued that though the Soviets did mobilize a few 
divisions that could support a crackdown against Solidarity, the position of the Soviet 
government throughout the crisis was to coerce the Polish government, using a range of 
supportive to hostile motivations to crush the opposition. Based on the testimony of principals 
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in Poland by an invasion of Warsaw Pact forces was never seriously considered. In effect, 
Martial law disguised for years a major policy shift not to use force to impose Soviet socialist 
orthodoxy on the Eastern Bloc. 
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The Openness in Russia and Eastern Europe Project began in the aftermath of the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. A collaboration of experts exploited attendant openings of Eastern 
Bloc archives and combined them with related archival materials from the West to create 
collections of primary source documents related to Cold War crises. In the collection From 
Solidarity to Martial Law, the documents related to the Polish Crisis of 1980-1981 were 
combined with recollections of major historical participants to update the study on Poland. The 
editors drew extensively from sources in the collection to write “The Polish Crisis: Internal and 
International Dimensions,” an essay serving as a detailed summation of the collection explaining 
events which the editors speculated marked the beginning of the end of the Cold War. From the 
initial rise in food prices in July of 1980 sparking a rash of strikes, the editors asserted Poland’s 
case was qualitatively different than previous rebellions against Soviet control. The synergy 
created by strikes, the Catholic Church, and the opposition combined in Solidarity to represent an 
alternative force for change unlike any communist government had faced before. To meet the 
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threat, the Soviet Union vacillated between using Warsaw Pact forces to crush Solidarity with an 
invasion and pressuring the Polish People’s Republic to crackdown on Solidarity using Polish 
security forces. The editors reported that because most Polish and Russian military records had 
not been released and other information remains inconclusive, it cannot be known whether the 
Warsaw Pact’s Soyuz-80 maneuvers in December, 1980, were prelude to an invasion or just 
meant to intimidate the Polish leadership into declaring martial law. Through the remainder of 
the crisis, ample documentary evidence confirmed the Soviet Union maintained pressure on the 
Polish government until Solidarity was suppressed. The editors cited a number of reasons that 
discouraged the Soviet Union from carrying out an invasion of Poland, including the potential of 
violent Polish resistance to Soviet military intervention, internal weakness in the Soviet Union, 
and the substantial Soviet involvement in Afghanistan. The authors determined both the Carter 
and Reagan administrations directed active measures against the Soviet Union alternately 
rewarding restraint and imposing sanctions based on its treatment of Solidarity. 
 
Rachwald, Arthur R. In Search of Poland: The Superpowers’ Response to Solidarity, 1980-1989. 
Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1990.  
 
Rachwald traced the progression of the resistance of the independent Polish trade union 
movement to communist control through the 1980s. In imposing martial law, Polish and Soviet 
communist authorities sought but failed to restore the status quo ante; the aspirations of the 
people could not be quelled in large part because of the massive refusal of the Polish people to 
cooperate with reforms designed to right the economy. The threat of military intervention by the 
Soviet Union and its allies was averted in large measure because of support from the United 
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States for the Solidarity movement combined with political and economic disincentives applied 
to pressure the governments in Warsaw and Moscow. Rachwald’s study relied extensively on 
European and American periodicals. 
 
Rakowska-Harmstone, Teresa, ed. Communism in Eastern Europe, 2nd ed. Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1984. 
 
Communism in Eastern Europe, a 1984 area study compilation, surveyed regional 
specialists’ analyses on the origin, development, practice, and prospects for Communism in 
Eastern Europe. In her capstone chapter, “Nationalism and Integration in Eastern Europe,” 
Rakowska-Harmstone recapitulated a central theme of the collection: competing interests 
subsisted between the Soviet Union as hegemonic superpower and its resistant subject states. 
Treatment of the interaction of those two forces, often at odds, helped inform the collection’s 
essays profiling the eight Communist Eastern European countries as well as the four thematic 
chapters on politics, economics, Soviet intervention, and tensions of integration and nationalism 
in opposition. The authors’ essays together provided a significant update from the 1979 edition 
by further explicating the differing interests of the Soviet Union and the Eastern European states. 
Notable contributions related to developing events in Poland. Aspaturian provided insights in 
“Eastern Europe in World Perspective” on the significance of Poland in aggregate as Europe’s 
fifth largest nation and that the very existence of the Soviet system depended on maintaining 
control of its client states. Korbonski’s essay on “Poland” revealed why Communism as a system 
was unable to penetrate Polish society. His detailed treatment of Solidarity analyzed the 
movement as an unprecedented phenomenon of diverse groups aligning en masse to undercut 
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control of the Polish Communist government. Remington’s and Ulc’s respective essays on 
“Yugoslavia” and “Czechoslovakia” defined and rendered operative understanding of the 
Brezhnev Doctrine. Valenta’s “Crisis, Intervention, and Normalization,” explained the Soviet 
Union’s differentiated responses to revolts in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland along with 
accompanying approaches to normalization. Rakowska-Harmstone, in “Nationalism and 
Integration,” emphasized the connection of the Soviet Union’s nuclear prowess and major 
buildup of conventional military strength in the 1970s with the geopolitical importance of 
Eastern Europe to the Soviet Union for both defensive and offensive purposes in the context of 
ongoing Eastern European resistance to control by Moscow. The authors’ essays in the 
collection, which addressed the Polish Crisis, lent support to the prevailing orthodox position 
that the Soviet Union would act in accordance with the Brezhnev Doctrine to maintain control of 
Eastern Europe by intervening directly or indirectly as necessary. 
 
Reagan, Ronald W. An American Life. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990. 
 
Upon taking office, Reagan reflected in his autobiography a deep contempt for 
Communism, judging it a failed system. The president expressed determination to pursue 
policies encouraging the stirrings of nationalism in Poland and the Eastern Bloc. The inherent 
strength of the free market system and the wealth it generated would be used to accelerate 
Communism’s demise. Viewing the Brezhnev Doctrine as the ideological mechanism used to 
justify Soviet expansionism throughout the world, Reagan deliberately exploited media to push 
back against policies that he deemed enslaved humanity and perpetuated a dangerous nuclear 
arms race. Additionally, Reagan’s administration began a campaign exchanging a series of 
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diplomatic and personal notes to Soviet counterparts. The notes confronted the Soviet 
government’s modus operandi inherent in the Brezhnev Doctrine that the historical correctness 
of its political system justified behavior violating long-established norms of international 
behavior by subverting the sovereignty of independent nations. Assuming office in the midst of 
the Polish Crisis, Reagan’s administration also sought to strike a practical balance by supporting 
the Polish people through food aid to alleviate hunger and international credits to avert an 
economic collapse while threatening the Soviet Union with diplomatic pressure, economic 
sanctions, and the end of nuclear arms agreements if it launched an invasion of Poland. 
Subsequent to the declaration of martial law, the Reagan administration held the Soviet Union 
responsible imposing a range of sanctions with limited success by enlisting the cooperation of 
European allies. Reagan’s view of the Soviet Union’s commitment to actively promoting 
ideologically driven expansionism, the Brezhnev Doctrine, did not begin to change until 
Gorbachev assumed leadership of the Soviet Union in March of 1985. Then, the president noted, 
policies supporting Cuba, Vietnam, and Syria diminished, Soviet repression of dissidents eased, 
and jamming of Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe broadcasts ended. 
 
Staar, Richard F. Foreign Policies of the Soviet Union. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 
1991.  
 
Encyclopedic in scope and concise in content, Starr’s treatment of Foreign Policies of the 
Soviet Union proceeded first by establishing the USSR’s foundations in historical, decision-
making, and foreign policy terms. Next, instrumentalities of state function were analyzed 
focusing on foreign propaganda, intelligence, military strategy, and foreign trade. Finally, the 
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projection of policy was considered on a world regional basis. Extensive data from economic, 
military and political charts and graphs further illuminated Staar’s survey of Soviet foreign 
policy.  
 
Stokes, Gale. Three Eras of Political Change in Eastern Europe. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1997. 
 
This concise, clear work by Stokes trifurcated political change in eastern European 
politics into segments: Part I, “The Origin of East European Politics”; Part II, “The Rise and Fall 
of Yugoslavia”; and Part III, “1989: Prologue, Lessons, and Prospects.” Stokes described in his 
prologue the upheavals sweeping Eastern Europe in 1989, asserting that events of 1968 were 
foundational. Besides implementation of the Brezhnev Doctrine, the decision not to allow the 
bloc’s economies any basis except a rigid Soviet centrally planned model insured that socialism 
could not evolve in a democratic manner. As a result, much of the disaffected population 
abandoned the idea that the system in place could be reformed. What resulted was an anti-
political response to authority. Intellectuals like Havel encouraged people to create their own 
“space” by ignoring institutional control as much as possible and living an honest life. Workers 
in Poland in the 1970s were particularly adept at creating a civil society alternative grounded on 
these anti-political ideas to assume more and more control of their working and social 
environment. Stokes concluded that despite Solidarity’s protestations it was an independent labor 
union and not a party, the union inevitably became a political force because it represented over 
half the actively working population in the country. Stokes’s research credited a combination of 
European and American journal articles and texts related to Eastern European politics. 
136 
 
Summerscale, Peter. The East European Predicament: Changing Patterns in Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, and Romania. New York: The Royal Institute of International Affairs 
and St. Martin’s Press, 1982.  
 
The objective of Summerscale’s study was to explain contemporaneous developments in 
Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Romania based on political, economic and social factors. Not being 
an East European specialist, his analysis benefited from review by Seton-Watson and Schopflin. 
The authors’ chapter, “Czechoslovakia 1968 Poland 1980: The International Dimension,” served 
as a valuable essay identifying similarities and differences between the Czechoslovak and Polish 
crises in the areas of origin, control, censorship, ideology, military/security risks, Western 
response, etc. In the aftermath of the December, 1981, crackdown in Poland, Summerscale 
concluded the Brezhnev Doctrine, though not visibly imposed by Jaruzelski employing martial 
law, was alive and well. For sources, the author relied primarily on the works of leading 
historians and principal political figures as well as notable European publications.  
 
Thompson, Terry L. Ideology and Policy: The Political Uses of Doctrine in the Soviet Union. 
Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989. 
 
Thompson surveyed the relation of ideology to policy in the Soviet Union from Stalin to 
Gorbachev. The author argued ideology has always driven Soviet policy by providing a frame 
for determining governing options and achieving regime goals. Brezhnev reasserted centralizing 
control after Khrushchev’s emphasis on devolution of authority to local and regional governing 
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structures. By the 1970s, however, the Soviet Union’s hold on the Eastern Bloc began to weaken 
because of uncertainty in relations with the United States and China, increasing corruption, and 
economic difficulty. Reports of the 1976 World Communist Conference called for non-
interference among socialist states. Loss of central authority became further evident with the 
1980-1981 Polish Crisis. Thompson’s diverse sources included periodicals, journal articles, and 
books from both Eastern Europe and the West. Many of the works focused on strategic studies 
and political theory. 
 
Tismaneanu, Vladimir. Reinventing Politics: Eastern Europe from Stalin to Havel. New York: 
Maxwell Macmillan, 1992.  
 
After providing post-World War I historical context, Tismaneanu’s book used a 
comparative approach in tracing the imposition and breakdown of Communist governments in 
Eastern Europe. A main contention of the work was that totalitarian rule ended because of the 
origin and maturation of civil societies. As evidence, the author identified parallel activist 
organizations: Solidarity in Poland, Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia, and Democratic Opposition in 
Hungary, as emerging from civil society to challenge Communism’s monopoly on power. 
Tismaneanu’s book lacked a dedicated bibliography. It relied heavily on the writings and 
speeches of Eastern European intellectuals. 
 
Weigel, George. The End and the Beginning: Pope John Paul II – The Victory of Freedom, the 
Last Years, the Legacy. New York: Doubleday, 2010.  
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As Pope John Paul II’s official biographer, Weigel’s concluding volume on Karol 
Wojtyla focused on the Catholic Church’s struggle against communism, the last years of John 
Paul II’s pontificate, and the author’s assessment of the impact of the pope’s life. The chapter, 
“Confrontation,” spans Wojtyla’s election as pope in October, 1978 through December, 1981. 
An overarching theme running through the chapter relating to the Brezhnev Doctrine posited that 
the pope’s nine day visit to Poland in 1979 inspired mass resistance to continued communist 
control. Weigel’s coverage of the Vatican’s activity during the Polish Crisis revealed important 
insights: the pope and President Reagan shared remarkably similar views on human rights and 
the aspirations of the Polish people, but did not coordinate their actions; uncovered Soviet/East 
Bloc communications revealed an abiding fear of Solidarity and the Church working in tandem; 
and Vatican diplomats sometimes worked at cross-purposes to John Paul II’s objectives in 
central and eastern Europe by continuing to promote the Ostpolitik accommodation policies of 
Pope Paul VI. The author took no position on the use of Warsaw Pact forces intervening if 
needed to support the embattled government of the Polish People’s Republic, only reporting 
historians’ differing viewpoints. 
 
Weigel, George. Witness to Hope: The Biography of John Paul II. New York: HarperCollins 
Publishers, 1999.  
 
Weigel’s massive biography of John Paul II proceeded chronologically from childhood 
through his papacy to the date of publication. Chapters were organized thematically reflecting 
life-changing passages during the pope’s lifetime such as his upbringing and World War II years. 
Within each chapter, Weigel fleshed out notable events in topical segments. Relevant topics 
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addressed included: the pope’s visit to Poland in 1979, attacks on the pope by the Kremlin, the 
assassination attempt, and interaction with principals related to the Polish Crisis of 1980-1982. 
Weigel contended normalization after 1968 failed because the Polish people supported 
Solidarity, not the Communist government which was strongly challenged as well by the moral 
authority of the pope. Chapter notes and bibliographical sources were extensive and varied, but 
included a preponderance of church documents and works by and about the pope. 
 
Weschler, Lawrence. Solidarity: Poland in the Season of its Passion. New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1982. 
 
Weschler writes conversationally in his contemporaneous account of the Polish Crisis. 
An expanded compendium of his articles originally written for The New Yorker on Solidarity 
provided the basis of his study. Notes were limited and sources were contextual. This book’s 
value resides in its dedicated chronology of Poland from 1939 and its facsimile of the 
Interfactory Strike Committee’s (Miedzyzakladowy Komitet Strajkowy, MKS) 21 demands, 
which became the basis for negotiations between Solidarity and the Polish government. 
 
Zubok, Vladislav M. A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to 
Gorbachev. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2007. 
 
Zubok, a Russian national and Cold War historian, surveyed the Soviet Union’s 
motivations in confronting the West from the end of World War II to the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. The author drew on his experience dating back to his time as a researcher in the Soviet 
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Union at the Institute of U.S. and Canada Studies, and continuing as an academic in residence at 
multiple university and study institutes internationally. Zubok’s work benefited from both the 
recent uncovering of cross-national Cold War archival evidence as well as efforts made to create 
oral histories of Cold War historical actors. In seeking to understand Soviet Cold War 
motivations, Zubok analyzed ideology, national experience going forward from World War II, 
and social groupings especially elites and leaders. Within this framework, the chapter, “The Old 
Guard’s Exit, 1980-1987,” addressed multiple challenges to the Soviet Union’s superpower 
status, including hemorrhaging deficits spiked by subsidies to Warsaw Pact countries and client 
states, diminishing control over satellite states influenced by their growing financial dealings 
with the West, and economic sanctions stemming from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. 
Zubok assessed the Polish Crisis of 1980-1981 as the most serious of all the threats in the early 
1980s to Soviet control over its socialist empire, with Solidarity leading a massive national 
movement demanding foundational societal change. The author confirmed by using documentary 
evidence that because of the precarious state of both the Soviet economy and European détente 
after Helsinki, Brezhnev and Andropov both declared in party deliberations that no 
Czechoslovakia-style invasion of Poland was possible. Subsequently, the Soviets maintained 
control over Poland under the cover of Polish imposed martial law. Zubok concluded by 
agreeing with Ouimet’s determination that the Brezhnev Doctrine effectively ended as a 
mechanism of Soviet control in the Eastern Bloc at the time of the Polish Crisis. 
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